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Abstract 
As research in provincial, national and international contexts has shown, 
commercial fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations. Different 
approaches to risk and perceptions of risk (such as biophysical , structural, 
cultural, and human capital) often examine safety from a single perspective, 
resulting in partial understandings of the causes of accident and injury. This 
thesis presents fish harvesters' observations on safety at sea through their 
descriptions of risky events, accidents and near-misses, and their views on the 
effectiveness of recent safety initiatives, in an effort to create a more multi-
dimensional understanding of risk and accidents at sea. Major findings include 
insights about the cascading effects of risk factors seen through the eyes of 
harvesters and their perceptions of the unintended safety consequences of 
conservation regulations. Tomer and colleagues' (1999) participatory safety 
intervention process is proposed as an effective way to address the interactive 
nature of such risk factors and improve prevention. 
11 
Acknowledgements 
I am deeply grateful to the 46 harvesters who took the time to participate in this 
study. I greatly appreciate their insights and cheerful willingness to share their 
experiences and hard-won wisdom. 
I would also like to thank the members of the SafeCatch Perceptions of Risk 
research team: Dr. Barbara Neis, Dr. Marian Binkley and Dr. Nicole Power. I feel 
honored and enriched to have worked with the three of you. Dr. Neis, I extend 
tremendous thanks to you for your patience and expertise while guiding me 
through this process. Thanks are also due to three research assistants: Nancy 
Leawood, Melissa Kennedy, and Julie Matthews, who were also part of the 
Perceptions of Risk team. 
The SafeCatch community partners deserve resounding thanks, including the 
FFAW/CAW union, especially George Chafe; and the Professional Fish 
Harvesters Certification Board (PFHCB), particularly Mark Dolomount. 
This research was funded by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Grant 
CAHR-43269 through SafetyNet, a Community Research Alliance on Health and 
Safety in Marine and Coastal Work based at Memorial University in St. John's, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada. Funding was also provided by the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation 
Commission, Memorial University and the National Search and Rescue 
Secretariat New Initiatives Fund. 
I would like to warmly and deeply thank my partner Mark Vokurka. Thanks also 
to my parents, Joan and Rodderick Brennan, who encouraged me every step of 
the way, and continually inspire my love of learning. 
lll 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures vi 
List of Appendices vii 
Chapter One: Introduction I 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 14 
Occupational Risk and Perceptions of Risk 15 
Theoretical Approaches to Risk 17 
Biophy ical Determinist Approach 18 
Human Capital Approach 20 
Structural Approach 22 
Cultural Approach 24 
Integrated Approach 26 
Risk and Perceptions of Risk in the Fishing Safety Literature 28 
International, National, and Provincial Fi hing Safety Re earch 28 
Risk Approaches in the Fishing Safety Literature 30 
Biophysical Determini t Approach 30 
Human Capital Approach 3 1 
Structural Approach 33 
Cultural Approach 34 
Integrated Approach 36 
An Integrated Approach to Fishing Safety 38 
Strengths of an Integrated Approach 40 
Chapter Three: Methodology 43 
Rationale 43 
Selection of Delivery Mode: Telephone Interviews 45 
Development of the Interview Schedule 47 
Outline of Interview Sections 49 
Sample 53 
Ethical Considerations 56 
Data Collection and Analysis 57 
Importance and Limitations 59 
Summary 60 
Chapter Four: Results 62 
Demographic Data 62 
An Inherently Dangerous Job 67 
Their Experience with Risky Situations Accidents and Injuries 68 
What Do They Do About Safety? 71 
lV 
Job Satisfaction 8i 
"They never hurts like we do ": Who Defines Risk? 84 
imaginary Curricula Vitae 86 
Chapter Five: Discussion 92 
Diversity 93 
Biophysical Environment 96 
Human Capital Approach 98 
Structure iOi 
Intended Safety Consequences of Regulations I 03 
Unintended Safety Consequences of Regulations I 05 
Safety Con equences of Too Little Regulation I 07 
Cultural Approach i09 
Protective Factors 110 
Applying the integrated Framework 112 
Cascading Effect I 13 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 124 
Major Findings 125 
Strengths and Limitations 127 
Implications 129 
Directions for Future Research i 32 
Works Cited 134 
Appendices 140 
v 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Number of vessels in each fleet ...................................................................... 64 
Figure 2: Species targeted by participants in 2004 ...................................................... 65 
Figure 3: Fishing area in Newfoundland ...................................................................... 66 
Figure 4: Risky situations experienced by participants .............................................. 69 
Figure 5: Importance of training grouped by age of respondents .............................. 73 
Figure 6: Importance of safety training grouped by level of training ....................... 74 
Figure 7: Knowledge of safety equipment vs. equipment's presence onboard ......... 75 
Figure 8: Participants' satisfaction with fishing as a job ............................................ 82 
Figure 9: Curriculum Vitae 1: Older male harvester .................................................. 88 
Figure 10: Curriculum Vitae II: Younger male harvester .............•........................... 89 
Figure 11: Curriculum Vitae III: Female harvester ........................•........................... 90 
Vl 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A: Information sheet ........................................................... 140 
Appendix B: Recruitment letter ........................................................... 141 
Appendix C: Phone script and oral consent form ................................. 142 
Vll 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Fishing is an occupation plagued with extensive injuries, near-misses, and 
fatalities. In an international comparison of workforce injury and fatality rates, 
Roberts (2004) found fishing to be one of the most hazardous occupations. 
Research done in the 1980s on Nova Scotia's deep-sea groundfish and scallop 
harvesting found it to be one of the most dangerous and physically demanding 
occupations in Canada: "each year more workers in the deep sea fishery die or 
sustain injuries from work-related accidents than in any other industry" (Binkley, 
1995: 4). Wiseman and Burge characterize the marine environment in 
Newfoundland and Labrador as having a "higher than normal range of risks" 
(2000: 3), due to the combined impact of weather, distance traveled to fish, 
vessel stability, and fatigue. Pelot's work confirms the high rates of risk in the 
Newfoundland fisheries (2000). 
Risk is mediated by external forces that also shape, enable, and constrain 
perceptions and choices. There are five main approaches in existing research 
on risk. The biophysical approach concentrates on the human body and the 
physical environment as the primary sources of risk. The human capital 
approach locates risk in the characteristics of the individual, such as gaps 
in training or experience. The structural approach focuses on the contribution of 
regulatory and organizational factors to risk, and the cultural approach 
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emphasizes the social construction of risk and the factors that mediate what is 
selected for mitigation and what is considered to be a "normal" part of the 
job. Some recent studies have called for a fifth, integrated approach to risk that 
incorporates elements of each of the other approaches and pays particular 
attention to interactions between biophysical, human capital , structural and 
cultural factors. 
This project investigates Newfoundland and Labrador fish harvesters' 
accident and injury experience and perceptions of risk in order to explore their 
first-hand knowledge about safety at sea. The research for this thesis was carried 
out between 2003 and 2005. The study draws on first-hand information from fish 
harvesters collected primarily through phone interviews but with input from focus 
groups and discussions with fish harvesters during a subsequent component of 
the project involving boat tours. The research seeks to explore with fish 
harvesters their experience with accidents and injuries over the previous decade; 
their perceptions of the causes of accidents; their experiences with injuries and 
near-misses; their sense of whether and how the risks associated with fishing 
have changed over the past decade; and perceptions of the relative importance 
of regulatory, technological and other changes in determining risk. Careful 
attention to these harvesters' observations on risk and safety supports the call for 
an integrated approach to understanding risk and promoting safety with related 
attention to how factors cascade, interact, and change over time. Fish 
harvesters' unique views from the deck of the vessel highlight the need for a 
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comprehensive safety strategy which can address biophysical, human capital, 
structural and cultural factors and account for the interactivity of these factors as 
well as the dynamism of the industry. 
Overall research on risk in fishing has typically distinguished between 
occupational risk and perceived danger. Researchers often base this distinction 
on a comparison between perceived levels of risk and patterns of risk indicated in 
occupational statistics (Jermier, Gaines & Macintosh 1989; Rousseau & Libuser 
1997). This comparison provides an indication of the extent to which worry, 
trivialization and fatalism are employed by fish harvesters to deal with risky 
situations (Murray, Fitzpatrick & O'Connell 1997; Binkley 1994, 1995; Roberts 
1993). Such research has found high levels of reported anxiety among 
fishermen and that those who reported the most anxiety reported more injuries 
and fewer safety precautions (Murray, Fitzpatrick & O'Connell 1997: 292). 
When comparing levels of perceived danger to levels of statistically 
determined occupational risk in different work environments, it is essential to 
account for factors that mediate risk and perceptions of risk. Working across 
multiple occupations, researchers have identified the following important 
mediating factors: gender (Grzetic 2004; Jermier, Gaines & Macintosh 1989); 
level of education or training (Gaba & Viscusi 1998); social influences (Siovic 
1987); type of enterprise (Eakin, Lamm & Limberg 2000); and whether or not 
other work is available (Roberts 1993: 81 ). It is also important to examine how 
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official injury and accident statistics are compiled to discover if regulators are 
missing part of the picture. 
Research on risk and perceptions of risk in fishing has traditionally 
focused on either behavioral (human) factors (Murray, Fitzpatrick & O'Connell 
1997; Pollnac, Poggie & VanDusen 1995) or non-behavioral (structural and 
environmental) factors (Pelot 2000; Wiseman & Burge 2000). Research on 
perceptions of risk tends to be carried out by anthropologists and psychologists, 
and emphasizes the role of human, behavioral factors in contributing to risk. 
Valuable information has emerged from this approach. For example, researchers 
have gathered information to help create new ways of encouraging safety 
equipment usage. Authors of a psychological analysis of danger and safety 
among New England commercial oceanic fishermen argued that the low rates of 
use of personal safety equipment occurred simply due to fish harvesters' failure 
to "take interest" in the use of safety equipment (Pollnac, Poggie & VanDusen 
1995: 153). However, this approach presents only one aspect of the relationship 
between attitudes and safety behaviors, as there are other mediating factors that 
may be involved as well. Some such factors include the affordability and 
availability of safety equipment, the training needed to use the equipment, and 
the fish harvesters' level of conviction that the item will actually be useful in an 
emergency. Thus behavioral factors, measured through psychometric tests, are 
only one part of the complete safety picture. 
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Other researchers and policymakers have focused their attention more on 
non-behavioral factors. Van Noy (1995) suggests that the Coast Guard, in its 
routine analyses of accidents at sea, tends to emphasize structural factors such 
as vessel safety and Search and Rescue operations. Her research collaborated 
with harvesters to examine incident reports closely, and found that harvesters 
believed individual actions contributed to the occurrence of 51 percent of 
accidents, as compared to the Coast Guard, which attributed behavioral causes 
to only 18 percent. 
While Wiseman and Burge (2000) acknowledge the role of individual 
behavioral factors in mediating risk, they argue that structural or non-behavioral 
factors have been neglected in safety discussions. Their study of 1990s trends 
in the under-65' sector in the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry 
focuses primarily on non-behavioral factors, arguing that dynamism and related 
structural changes need to be addressed in efforts to reduce risk. For example, 
changes in this fishery resulted in smaller vessels fishing further from shore (17). 
The authors, addressing industry regulators and others, argue that other 
stakeholders must act with harvesters to reduce risk: "[w]ithout absolving 
fishermen of their responsibility to adopt proper safety measures for the safe 
operation of their vessels, other players must recognize their responsibility and 
act decisively" (18). Wiseman and Burge also recognize the extensive economic 
constraints on access to safety equipment among these fish harvesters 
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suggesting that government provide grants or tax rebates to help harvesters 
purchase safety equipment (C4). 
Some recent research emphasizes the importance of integrating the two 
frameworks. For example, Jensen, Christensen, Larsen and Soerensen 
(1996:14) advocate safety promotion through both a behavioral approach- such 
as increasing motivation for injury prevention and finding new ways to prevent 
slips and falls - and a non-behavioral approach, such as vessel design and the 
availability of safety equipment. Researchers agree that such integration is 
challenging, particularly within the framework of a single study. Roberts 
reinforces this view, and adds: 
.. . safety measures should be developed through dialogue with fishermen 
and the fishing industry. This should be achieved by the use of 
multidisciplinary teams of experts, including fishermen, who are most able 
to develop safety solutions that are both practicable and economically 
affordable to the fishing industry (2004:22) . 
Other researchers have proposed similar techniques for developing safety 
measures. A selection of these techniques, such as a model for promoting 
implementation of safety measures, will be presented in the next chapter. 
Some researchers approach risk from the perspective that human factors 
have been an under-represented variable in this overall , integrated picture of 
fishing safety. This is not to say that those who seek to attribute incidents to 
behavioral or structural factors exclusively are wrong; rather, it is to say that a 
complete picture includes both. As mentioned earlier, the United States Coast 
Guard is responsible for safety at sea and its attention has traditionally been 
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focused on vessel safety and on search and rescue operations, not on injuries. 
Van Noy (1995) worked with fish harvesters to modify a Coast Guard study in 
order to identify human factors associated with risk, and this type of comparative 
work can be very useful in identifying gaps in our knowledge. VanNoy utilizes a 
theoretical framework which incorporates the concepts of health education and 
injury control, reflecting the distinction between behavioral and non-behavioral 
factors. Users of the framework can assess the impact of multiple determinants 
on the injury problem, choose effective and feasible interventions, and evaluate 
various intervention strategies (1995: 20). 
Some authors see the distinction between risk and perception of risk as 
false, arguing that the study of "objective risk" is less useful than creating new 
deliberative decision-making processes (Tansey & O'Riordan 1999:88). A 
corollary of this is that it is important to investigate to what extent the 
representation of "risk" by fish harvesters is shaped by their perceptions of risk as 
opposed to other factors. For example, Joffe (1999) has argued that we need to 
examine how the coping mechanisms of people who work in dangerous 
industries (such as fatalism or dismissal or trivialization of risk) might undermine 
the implementation of safety practices and the regulation of the industry. This 
approach points to potential interactive effects among perceptions of risk, 
regulations that might influence actual levels of risk, and responses to that risk 
among fish harvesters and others. Similarly, research has shown that while fish 
harvesters consider rough weather to be an important risk factor in accident and 
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injury, most incidents happen in bright, calm weather (Jensen, Christensen, 
Larsen & Soerensen 1996: 14). However, the relationship between risk and 
weather can be mediated by a range of other factors including harvester 
familiarity with a particular area and sea conditions in that area under specific 
weather conditions; harvester familiarity with their vessel and how it handles in 
different sea conditions. 
An integrated approach, which accounts for both behavioral and non-
behavioral factors and draws our attention to such mediating factors as 
economics, regulation, culture, and the dynamism of fisheries, is needed to 
develop a more complete understanding of sources of risk and injury, 
perceptions of risk and injury and potential ways to influence these. 
Contemporary fisheries are often highly dynamic with changes driven by 
ecological and regulatory changes as well as technological innovations and other 
factors. This dynamism needs to be taken into account when we seek to explore 
the relationship between perceptions of risk and actual risk levels (Pelot 2000; 
Jensen, Christensen, & Soerensen 1996; Dolan et al. 2005; Binkley 1995). 
This thesis contributes to academic knowledge about fishing safety 
including patterns and sources of risk associated with commercial fishing, as well 
as potential ways to reduce accidents and injuries. The framework that guides 
this research begins from the assumption that all knowledge is partial and 
mediated by social-ecological processes (Neis & Kean 2003). From this 
perspective, exploration of fishery-related risks, accidents, injuries, and 
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perceptions of risk can benefit from input from a variety of practitioners including 
not only fishing safety experts but also fish harvesters as well as researchers 
from different disciplinary backgrounds. We treat harvesters as experts in the 
field of fishing safety recognizing that knowledge or expertise related to fishing 
safety varies among harvesters and over time and, when combined with insights 
from other groups, can contribute to a fuller and more effective understanding of 
experience and risk, as well as perceptions of the latter. Actively involving fish 
harvesters and their representatives in fishing safety research can contribute to 
the likelihood that such research will reflect complex realities, will be understood 
and accepted by harvesters and can help promote discussion among different 
groups responsible for fishing safety. 
It is often the case that "expert" or technical knowledge is valued more 
than experiential knowledge (Neis & Kean 2003). Fish harvesters stand at the 
point of interaction of all the factors that influence risk, accidents and injuries, and 
are well situated to observe their interactive, cascading effects. These factors 
include the ocean environment (weather, navigation, working on a moving 
platform), vessel design (harvesting technologies, stability), the safety and 
fisheries management regulatory framework (season length, vessel size 
restrictions, gear-removal deadlines), and human factors (training, experience, 
skipper and crew relations, crew dynamics) (Windle et al. 2008; Bornstein et al. , 
2006). Their insights are particularly important in a dynamic, changing industry 
where it is important to anticipate risk and seek to mitigate it. Their expertise, 
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combined with that of technical , social and other scientific experts, can produce a 
fuller understanding of the factors that can be meaningfully affected to help 
reduce risk of accident and injury. A careful examination of harvesters' 
observations about risk and safety at sea highlights the importance of the view 
from the deck. 
This study is one part of a larger project called SafeCatch, one of nine 
research initiatives carried out by SafetyNet, a Community Research Alliance on 
Health and Safety in Marine and Coastal Work at Memorial University funded by 
the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, and the National Search and 
Rescue Secretariat New Initiatives Fund (for summaries of research completed, 
please see http://www.safetynet.mun.ca/projects1 .htm). The ultimate objective of 
SafeCatch was to identify means of reducing injury and fatality in the 
Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry. This thesis reports on some of the 
findings from the Perceptions of Risk component of SafeCatch. In that 
component, a series of 17 focus groups with expert fish harvesters explored their 
perceptions of factors that make fishing safer or more dangerous. The focus 
group discussions helped to identify areas in need of further research, such as 
the differences in risk associated with harvesting different species, issues related 
to changes in weather forecasting , and the safety implications of various 
government policies. The focus group data informed the design of a phone 
interview schedule. The schedule questions explore harvesters' fishing and 
accident history and their experience with safety training and equipment. Other 
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questions inquire about their perceptions of the role of technology, social 
relations, natural environments, state regulation and other factors in enhancing or 
reducing risk. Forty-six phone interviews were completed. Subsequently, 
researchers designed and carried out boat tours which involved a tour of the 
workplace- the vessel (Power, In Press; Bornstein et al., 2006). At the end of 
the boat tours, risk mapping identified particularly hazardous places and jobs on 
the boat using diagrams created by the interviewed harvesters. The size of 
participants' vessels ranged from under 35 feet to 65 feet. Activities reported as 
most dangerous included shooting and hauling gear, and operating heavy 
machinery. 
Harvesters have practical knowledge about the safety implications of 
policies and regulations, and can add to our understanding of the complexities 
and intricacies of a system often painted in black and white by the media and 
public figures. For example, fish harvesters argue that some policies enacted for 
economic or conservation purposes actually increase the risk they face. It is 
important to understand what makes them think this is the case and to 
understand the organizational factors that contribute to the risk of such 
interactive effects (Windle et al., 2008). Along with others, I think that an 
integrated approach to injury prevention must include personal, social, economic 
and regulatory factors (Jensen, Christensen, Larsen & Soerensen 1996; Van Noy 
1995; Wiseman & Burge 2000), as well as account for the interactivity of such 
factors and the dynamism of the fisheries. Incorporating fish harvesters' 
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experiences and perceptions into our safety research can help us move more 
rapidly and effectively towards such an approach. 
The remainder of this thesis explores how harvesters' knowledge can be 
incorporated into this integrated approach. Chapter Two reviews relevant 
international, national and regional research on the level of risk associated with 
fishing, explanations for risk and the literature on perceptions of risk. Chapter 
Three deals with the research methods employed, primarily the telephone 
interviews for this portion of the project and briefly covering the focus groups that 
preceded the phone interviews and the boat tours that followed . It also 
discusses the sampling process and the sample's demographics. Chapter Four 
presents the research findings on safety, beginning with a demographic overview 
and moving to harvesters' views on things that affect safety, such as training, 
regulations, and the importance of various external actors. Chapter Five begins 
by presenting the biophysical, human capital, structural and cultural aspects of 
the data, and then synthesizes the overall findings into an integrated framework 
to examine the interactive effects of the factors that influence accidents and 
injuries. Chapter Six concludes the thesis by returning to the general themes 
outlined here and in the literature review, discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the study, and identifies areas for further research. Appendices A 
to C include copies of the documents used to advertise the study, recruit 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
There exists a notion that the sea can "get into a man's blood," 
drawing him again and again to pit himself against the 
temperamental , uncaring, ceaseless roll of the wave. Many will 
say, quite correctly, that economic necessity keeps men returning 
to the sea. But there may be another fundamental lure, whether it 
be a yearning for the sensuous roll of a ship at sea, the 
camaraderie, the need to take a risk in an unpredictable 
environment, or something more mysterious. These are romantic 
and amorphous qualities, but they are part of a set of motivations 
that keep men returning to the hunt (Wright 1984: 87). 
High-risk work can have both positive aspects, such as high pay and high 
satisfaction, and negative aspects, such as the increased likelihood of stress, 
injury, disease, and death (Jermier, Gaines & Mcintosh 1989: 20) . Earlier 
research in this area often aligned itself with one of five main theoretical 
approaches to explain what risk is, how it is measured, and how it can be 
reduced. This chapter reviews the five main theoretical approaches to risk and 
perceptions of risk in the literature on work, including biophysical, human capital , 
structural, cultural , and integrated. I then review previous research on accidents, 
injuries and risk perception in fishing, particularly in Newfoundland, paying 
specific attention to the theoretical orientation underlying this work and to the 
findings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theoretical approach 
adopted in this thesis and in the larger Safe Catch project with which this work is 
associated. The integrated approach used here begins to fill in gaps that exist in 
fisheries research by acknowledging the dynamism, interactivity and complexity 
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of the causes of accidents (Van Noy 1995), while taking into account perceptions 
as well as behavioral and non-behavioral factors. 
Occupational Risk and Perceptions of Risk 
Definitions of occupational risk often refer to the parameters of risk, or the 
external risk that exists around people at work (Jermier, Gaines & Mcintosh 
1989: 16). However, there has been considerable debate over the nature of 
occupational risk, including to what extent it is "objective" and external, subjective 
and socially constructed, or a combination of the two. Risk analysts often begin 
by quantifying accidents and injuries and ranking the risk associated with 
particular occupations based on injury and fatality rates for workers (see Jin et al. 
2002, for an example). Such studies generally rely on official statistics, 
measuring occupational risk factors by examining statistics gathered on the 
average number of injuries and fatalities, usually through agencies such as 
worker compensation commissions. Statistical patterns are often used to 
develop preventive measures that employers and workers can take to enhance 
safety. 
Bartel and Thomas (1985) define the occupational risk terms "health" and 
"safety." Occupational health concerns, they argue, are characterized by 
ongoing, cumulative exposure leading to illnesses, while safety is a term 
reserved for the prevention of accidents which result in immediate injury or death 
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(25). Immediate injury and fatality rates are generally better captured in official 
statistics than physical health risks that develop over longer periods. Jermier and 
colleagues (1989: 16) break down occupational risk into the following 
components: physical harm (accidental and incremental) and emotional harm, as 
well as occupational risk and perceived danger. The distinction between 
accidental and incremental physical harm is comparable to the terms "safety" and 
"health" as defined by Bartel and Thomas (1985}. However, this approach adds 
two new layers: a focus on emotional in addition to physical harm and attention to 
the distinction between occupational risk and perceptions of risk. Some 
researchers argue that safety, as opposed to health, is typically the main priority 
of those concerned with risk (VanNoy 1995}. Risk, then, can be viewed as 
having a political dimension, including the decision process surrounding the 
identification of risk, what risk is considered to be "natural" rather than 
preventable, the selection of risks to be reduced or eliminated, and who is 
responsible for reducing such risks. 
The distinction between "objective" and "subjective" risk sometimes takes 
the shape of a debate over the difference between "risk" and "perceptions of risk" 
(Rousseau & Libuser 1997). Those concerned with subjective risk argue that it is 
important to discover what people mean when they say something is "risky," 
because "those who promote and regulate health and safety need to understand 
the ways in which people think about and respond to risk" (Slavic 1987: 236). 
For example, sometimes danger may contribute to the excitement felt by workers 
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for their job resulting in workers viewing attempts to reduce risk with indifference. 
Similarly, risk sometimes enhances dignity; therefore workers may resist efforts 
to decrease risk (Jermier, Gaines & Mcintosh 1989: 29 - 30). Risk researchers 
need to take into account the existence of multiple interpretations of risk so that 
safety programs are as meaningful and practical as possible for their targeted 
audiences. 
Theoretical Approaches to Risk 
There are five main approaches to risk in the occupational health and safety 
literature as it relates to the fishing industry. They are: 1) the biophysical 
determinist approach, which highlights the physical characteristics of the worker 
and the work environment; 2) the human capital approach, which emphasizes the 
individual's experience and attitudes; 3) the structural approach, which focuses 
on organizational influences on health and safety; 4) the cultural approach, which 
places emphasis on how perceptions and realities differ among groups; and 5) 
an integrated approach, which combines insights from the other four and adds 
interactivity and dynamism. This section will explore relevant points about each 
of the theoretical approaches, and demonstrate how an integrated framework 
could combine strengths from each. 
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Biophysical Determinist Approach 
The biophysical determinist approach tends to treat risk as objectively 
measurable and the larger work environment and human bodies as relatively 
constant or fixed. Researchers in this paradigm tend to locate risk in 
physiological or mental health or in the natural environment, rather than a 
worker's experience, for example. From this perspective, certain types of work 
are inherently more risky than other types of work (mining or fishing, for example) 
and particular types of people - such as men versus women, or big men versus 
small men - are biologically more suited for certain jobs (Messing 1998). This 
view is reflected in approaches.to work involving heavy lifting, as in firefighting 
and police work, which often require a strength or fitness test as part of the 
application process. A similar approach can be found in research on the causes 
of work-related mental health problems: "From the perspective of person-
environment fit theory, job stress signifies a poor fit between the demands of the 
work environment and what the individual is equipped to handle" (Kirschenbaum, 
Oigenblick & Goldberg 2000: 632). Such a definition of job stress may 
accurately describe some situations, but it glosses over the dynamic nature of 
work in many occupations. 
While it is true that biological and environmental characteristics differ 
between workers and worksites, the biophysical approach is most usefully 
understood as an entry point into risk research. Messing (1998) uses a 
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metaphor to describe the biological determinist approach to occupational health 
and its underlying assumptions: 
The theory of natural selection (square pegs in square holes, round pegs 
in round holes) would say that men and women have very different 
biological make-up and are "naturally" suited for different jobs. According 
to a crude version of this theory, men are stronger physically and more 
stable mentally. Being put into men's jobs is therefore dangerous for 
women, the more fragile sex (24). 
As Messing indicates, there are a number of shortcomings with biological 
determinist approaches to occupational health. These are illustrated by multiple 
shortcomings with fitness tests: 1) they often include tasks that do not resemble 
those usually performed on-the-job; 2) tasks and processes are typically 
designed around an average male form; 3) such tests do not measure other skills 
that may help in emergency situations (Messing 1998: 38-40). While women are 
sometimes excluded from jobs based on their gender, and on related 
assumptions about their fitness and strength, Power (2005) argues that not all 
men are able to perform such jobs either. This demonstrates that gender, and 
therefore related biophysical factors, are clearly not sufficient conditions on which 
to include or exclude workers from particular jobs. Similarly, a comprehensive 
view of safety requires attention to more than biophysical factors. 
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Human Capital Approach 
A second theoretical approach to occupational risk, human capital, is one of the 
most popular and has been adopted by many safety regulators. From this 
perspective, risk is clearly quantifiable and the primary cause of injury at work is 
human error linked to such factors as the employee's fatigue, stress, or lack of 
training. According to this theory, individual safety training designed to promote 
individual awareness is the most appropriate way to reduce risk. Iverson and 
Erwin (1997) tend to individualize risk in this way: 
... a large proportion of accidents can be attributed to human error. Add to 
this the finding that similarly large proportions of accidents are 
experienced by a relatively small percentage of the work force. This leads 
to the conclusion that the focus of research on accidents should be to 
identify those personal characteristics which predispose some individuals, 
rather than others, to be injured at work. This type of disposition is called 
accident proneness (Cited in Kirschenbaum, Oigenblick & Goldberg 2000: 
632-633). 
This quotation illustrates the importance of individual characteristics and accident 
experience in risk research. Some researchers have noted the presence of 
trivialization or fatalism as ways of dealing emotionally with risky situations 
(Binkley 1994, 1995; Roberts 1993), and argue that such coping strategies can 
interfere with the safety training process by preventing at-risk workers from taking 
appropriate safety measures. It is important to note that perceptions of risk can 
have an impact on workers' health, as well as affecting their likelihood of being 
involved in an accident. Heightened perception of risk (of being in a dangerous 
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environment) can lead to health problems such as heartburn, stress, and 
depression (Roberts 1993). 
From the human capital/human error perspective, the relationship of risk 
to perceptions of risk is similar to focusing a lens in order to see an image more 
clearly: there are risks 'out in the world' to be measured, and the necessary task 
is to bring the perceptions of the worker into alignment with the 'real world' 
through training and experience (Pollnac, Poggie & VanDusen 1995). Individuals 
are often identified as either "risk averse" or "risk seeking" (Weber & Milliman 
1997: 123), although some researchers have argued that this split is explained 
by the individual's perception of the riskiness of the choice. To this end, Gaba 
and Viscusi (1998) demonstrate that perceptions of risk are mediated by level of 
education, with the results of their research supporting the claim that those with 
less education are less likely to consider a particular job risky. Their findings 
suggest effort should be concentrated on how people define risk, as well as what 
factors they feel contribute to risky situations. Some researchers have attempted 
to explain why people have different levels of anxiety and why they use different 
coping mechanisms to deal with it (Murray & Dolomount 1994; Joffe 1999). From 
this perspective, coping mechanisms like denial or trivialization of risk can 
interfere to some degree with enhancing safety, and raising awareness is the key 
to increasing safety. 
While useful to understand part of the picture, the human capital approach 
to occupational risk has some important limitations. An exclusive focus on 
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personal characteristics and individuals obscures some of the broader structural 
factors that also contribute to the occurrence of accidents, and pays insufficient 
attention to the role of regulators, employers and employer-worker interactions in 
influencing risk and its outcomes. To address such structural factors, human 
capital factors like perceptions of risk can be studied in a way that meaningfully 
links the perceptions with the circumstances in which they are generated: 
The beliefs people hold about risk are typically used in social science to 
explain behavioral outcomes, such as the actions people take to protect 
themselves against hazards. However, such perceptions might more 
usefully be studied as dependent variables, that is, by focusing on where 
ideas about risk come from in the first place (Tierney 1999: 227). 
This approach can be considered structural, and is explored in the next section. 
Structural Approach 
A third approach focuses primarily on structural and organizational risk factors 
such as economic pressure and regulation as a source of risk (Clarke & Short 
1993, Tierney 1999, Wiseman & Burge 2000). The roots of this approach lie in 
political economy. "Risky systems, from this perspective, have structural features 
that discourage safe operations, independent of the inevitability of normal 
accidents" (Kirschenbaum, Oigenblick & Goldberg 2000: 632). Researchers 
using this framework are interested in things like support services, emergency 
and long-term health and safety facil ities, and in examining how contextual 
factors shape and are shaped by human actors. Tierney, for example, 
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emphasizes "the broader organizational, institutional, and societal factors" (1999: 
228) that contribute to the occurrence of accidents. Clarke and Short push this 
emphasis further, arguing that "human error'' may sometimes be a superficial 
explanation of underlying systemic safety problems: 
The analytic procedures of the National Transportation Safety Board (the 
United States' major investigator of transportation accidents) prevent 
investigators from going much beyond attributions of human error in final 
reports. NTSB investigations focus mainly on the types of human error 
responsible for accidents, rather than possible underlying causes of the 
errors (1993: 387). 
From a structural standpoint then, human error should not necessarily be the 
sole focus of research and intervention; " ... judgments about risk and safety 
should ... be viewed as the by-products of decisions made on economic and 
political grounds" (Tierney 1999: 225). Other contextual factors, such as the type 
of enterprise in which a worker performs his or her duties, can impact risk and 
perceptions of risk as well. For instance, "small workplaces are very challenging 
to reach and change in terms of prevention and health promotion, through either 
regulatory or voluntary approaches" (Eakin, Lamm & Limberg, 2000: 228). 
The structural approach adds an important component to the study of 
occupational risk, and serves to deepen our understanding when combined with 
the human capital approach. The cultural approach discussed next furthers 




A cultural approach draws our attention to how various groups identify and seek 
to mitigate risk, and how certain understandings of risk and safety become 
accepted as 'true'. This approach sees risk as a social phenomenon that is 
defined differently by various groups of social actors (Douglas 1986), and 
focuses attention on the social processes that influence risk perception, 
definition, and mitigation. The aim of cultural theory "is to criticize the apparent 
depoliticization of risk issues - the subtle process of taking for granted the link 
between hazard identification and the normative choices that follow" (Tansey & 
O'Riordan 1999: 72). While regulation can reduce risk, it can also generate 
controversy over the allocation of the costs of safe production (Douglas 1986: 
20). Cultural theory can help to identify who is 'responsible' - or liable -for 
particular risks, and how this came to be. 
In this approach, the relationship of risk to perceptions of risk is mediated 
by cultural context. Cultural theorists argue there is no objective risk out in the 
world waiting to be discovered and measured; rather "risk" is moral and 
perceptual, and the critical task of researchers is to explain how certain patterns 
of risk are selected for attention while others are not (Douglas 1986: 55). In a 
similar fashion, Slavic claims that perceptions of risk are "mediated by social 
influences transmitted by friends, family, fellow workers, and respected public 
officials" (1987: 281 ). A human capital approach often obscures the creation 
process, treating risk as an obvious, external phenomenon; cultural theory, in 
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contrast, permits us to sociologically examine how specific sets of risks are 
named and acted upon. 
From the cultural perspective, coping strategies or mechanisms are not 
seen as 'interfering' with safety- they are important social variables which shape 
the way people act in the world. "The wrong way to think of the social factors 
that influence risk perception is to treat them as smudges which blur a telescope 
lens and distort the true image .... A better kind of analysis might treat such 
transformations of the image not as distortions but as improvements: the result of 
a sharper focus that assesses the society along with its assessments of risks" 
(Douglas 1986: 18). Similarly, Power (2005) describes social factors like coping 
strategies in critical, sociological terms: "Coping strategies are also sites in which 
to create meaning and a sense of self or identity, and they can become sites of 
resistance and accommodation. Coping strategies are not simply about meeting 
physical needs; rather, they are about both access to and the distribution and 
control of resources and ideas" (27). Thus, rather than attempting to distribute 
attention equally to all risks, groups in society tend to emphasize some risks 
while others are neglected. Joffe explains why all people are not equally subject 
to intense feelings of anxiety: 
The 'risk society' does not necessarily leave people with a 
heightened state of anxiety, as Beck's and Giddens' work may 
suggest. Nor do humans rely exclusively upon surveillance and 
insurance systems to control this anxiety, to 'colonize the future'. 
Humans possess defensive mechanisms which protect them 
from unwelcome emotion. These defenses are reflected in their 
representations of risks, which serve to control the anxiety 
evoked by the danger (1999: 7). 
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The representations of which Joffe speaks are those of the 'Other.' She argues 
that risk is typically conceptualized in terms of "it happens to others, not me" and 
that, as a consequence, we actually do not suffer from substantial levels of 
anxiety. Similarly, Douglas (1985) introduces the notion of subjective immunity: 
"In very familiar activities there is a tendency to minimize the probability of bad 
outcomes" (29). These statements have interesting implications in occupations 
where brave or fatalistic attitudes meet dangerous work. 
Integrated Approach 
A fifth, 'integrated' approach emphasizes the need for a broader framework for 
understanding risk that takes all of these elements into consideration (Jermier, 
Gaines & Mcintosh 1989; Messing 1998; Torner, Gagner, Nilsson, & Nordling 
1999). An integrated theoretical framework combines the benefits of the 
previous four approaches, including: the physicality of the worker and the job; the 
physical and intangible resources of the person; and the social, economic and 
cultural context in which the work occurs and the person lives, as well as 
interactivity between these factors and changes over time. 
Messing suggests that the best way to think about of the issue of person-
environment fit is in terms of the metaphor "clay pegs in clay holes" (1998: 24 ). 
This metaphor reconciles both the human error and structural approaches to risk, 
illustrating "mutual adaptation" (24) between the worker and the work 
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environment. Her analysis primarily focuses on the relationship between sex, 
gender and work, but the implications extend to other aspects of occupational 
risk as well. "If we do not accept biological or social determinism, the gendered 
division of labor in poultry processing and elsewhere must be explained in more 
complex ways, related to interactions among social, biological, and political 
factors in the historical context of particular factories and services" (Messing 
1998: 25}. Such comprehensive explanations could take into account the 
dynamism and complexity of worker/environment interactivity. 
Jermier and colleagues (1989) pull together the threads of the cultural and 
"objective" human error perspectives in a way that values both, arguing that 
"while it is likely that perceptions of physical danger are affected by social 
construction processes, they are also grounded in real injury, illness, and death 
probabilities" (28). The dynamism of risk is linked to the constant interaction 
between actors, their perceptions and structures: "risk levels are continually in 
flux because risk is a product of how social actors behave ... . More broadly, 
social change continually modifies risk and vulnerability" (Tierney 1999: 229). 
A comprehensive integrated approach to risk would therefore include 
human (physical, behavioral and attitudinal) factors, structural (political and 
economic) and cultural factors, with careful attention paid to the dynamic, mutual 
adaptations between the person and their environment. This type of integrated 
approach could hold significant explanatory power in the study of dangerous 
occupations. 
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Risk and Perceptions of Risk in the Fishing Safety Literature 
Fishing has a high rate of injury and fatality compared to most other occupations 
(Roberts 2004) and is thus a high risk occupation. It is also generally associated 
with high job satisfaction, partly due to "the sense of freedom, the excitement, the 
feeling of achievement in getting a good catch, the whole lifestyle of being a 
fisherman" (Murray & Dolo mount 1994: 1 0). Research conducted in international, 
national and provincial contexts has examined which fishing sectors are 
associated with high levels of risk, as well as which factors - situated in a 
complex, interactive web - influence risk and safety; and how they do so (Lawrie, 
Matheson & Morrison 2000; Binkley 1994, 1995; Murray & Dolomount 1994). A 
review of the literature suggests that an integrated approach to fishing safety 
research that combines fish harvesters' experiential knowledge with that of 
fisheries scientists, safety experts and policy-makers treats fishing safety as not 
only an "emergency protocol," but also as an ongoing workplace issue and 
considers both behavioral and non-behavioral factors that contribute to risk and 
safety, is the best approach. 
International, National, and Provincial Fishing Safety Research 
Research demonstrates the high incidence of injury and loss in the commercial 
fishing industry internationally, nationally, and provincially. "High rates of 
fatalities and injuries can be partially attributed to the inherently dangerous 
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working conditions involved in the industry. These include: an unpredictable and 
often hostile marine environment; unstable work platforms; resources that are 
mobile, variable, diverse, often dangerous (bites, poison, allergies) and often 
located in remote offshore areas; moveable and often heavy equipment, and a 
dependence on vessels for shelter and survival" (Windle et al., 2008). 
Researchers in Scotland found "back injuries were the most common type of 
injury sustained at sea. Leg or arm injuries, cuts requiring stitches, other hand 
injuries and head injuries were also fairly common" (Lawrie, Matheson & 
Morrison 2000: 254 ). In the United States, Van Noy (1995) gathered a panel of 
fish harvesters to conduct a peer review of Coast Guard incident reports. The 
panel found behavioral accident causes, or "unsafe actions," to be responsible 
for 51 percent (n=62) of the accidents they reviewed, while the Coast Guard 
assigned behavioral causes to only 18 percent (n=22) (1995: 27). There may be 
a tendency for official investigators to stop searching for contributing factors once 
they have identified a direct technical cause. In addition, Van Noy argues that 
this difference is based on the fact that the "assignment of cause is made by 
Coast Guard investigators who are trained in seamanship but rarely in fishing 
operations" (25}. The harvesters who peer-reviewed the reports, however, are 
much more familiar with the everyday tasks of fishing. This demonstrates the 
need to combine insights from regulators, investigators and practitioners to 
account for as many factors as possible. 
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In Newfoundland, a study conducted shortly before the cod moratorium 
revealed the most frequent injuries among participants to be cuts and bruises 
(42%) followed by sprains or strains (26%} and back injuries (Murray, 
Fitzpatrick& O'Connell 1997: 294). "Just over one-half of the fishermen reported 
having had at least one injury at sea in the past year. Approximately one-third of 
these reported that it required medical attention although only two required 
hospitalization" (295}. The high rates of injury juxtaposed with the low reporting 
rates to regulatory agencies suggest a need for new methods of reporting 
incidents to mitigate future risk. Alternatively, there may be a need to redefine 
the term 'accident' or 'injury' for both groups. 
Risk Approaches in the Fishing Safety Literature 
Biophysical Determinist Approach 
Relatively few accounts of risk in the fishing safety literature exclusively 
emphasize the inherent risks of working in marine environments or the fit 
between worker strength and fitness and the demands of fishing when explaining 
high injury rates. Lawrie and colleagues (2000) note high rates of smoking and 
obesity among harvesters, which may lead to cardiac problems. However, they 
also point to organizational factors as contributing to risk in this context: if a fish 
harvester has a heart attack on board, there may be little medical help available. 
Or, if the skipper's ability to navigate is compromised, the safety of all onboard 
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may be jeopardized because often, only certain crew members are trained in 
navigation. That said, some have suggested that there is a prevailing view that 
the physical requirements of fishing make it too challenging for women. Power 
argues, for example, that "physical prerequisites have been used to exclude 
women from fishing and to legitimate such exclusion. However, in the views of 
some fisher respondents, not all men could handle the hard work and long hours 
either'' (Power 2005: 89). Thus, while the physical characteristics of a particular 
job are important to consider, the relationship between a person and their work 
safety cannot be simply explained by factors like sex or physical size. 
Human Capital Approach 
A human capital approach to understanding risk and risk perceptions in fishing 
would focus on harvesters' attitudes, training, experiential knowledge and other 
internal resources. This approach is particularly prevalent in the perceptions of 
risk literature on fishing safety and, in some cases, can be very useful. For 
example, research has shown that while fish harvesters consider rough weather 
to be an important risk factor in accident and injury, most incidents happen in 
bright, calm weather (Jensen, Christensen, Larsen & Soerensen 1996:14). The 
human capital approach would explain this as an illustration of how individuals' 
perceptions of risk may not match reality. In this case, training may help spread 
accurate information about an occupational risk. 
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Murray and Dolomount (1994) used a psychological approach to examine 
the human or behavioral factors associated with risk and injury in the 
Newfoundland small boat fishery in the 1990s. Their work investigated levels of 
anxiety among haNesters and use of coping mechanisms, ultimately finding a 
high level of anxiety among haNesters but also that trivialization and fatalism 
were not as widespread as they anticipated. Murray and Dolomount suggest that 
this finding may be a result of shortcomings in their research instrument. An 
alternative explanation might be that the shortcoming is in the approach; perhaps 
asking some questions from a structural or cultural standpoint might shed light on 
why the results were not parallel with their predictions. 
Pollnac, Poggie and VanDusen (1995) use a human capital approach in 
their research on New England commercial fish haNesters, focusing on 
individual factors such as lack of safety training, a lower position in the crew, 
kinsmen in the crew, and more years fishing (153) when explaining the 
relationship between attitude and safety behavior. They argue such factors 
contribute to a "less realistic perception of the severity" (157) of eight types of 
accidents, as compared to Coast Guard data. Denial and trivialization are 
emphasized here, as well as in Murray and Dolomount's work, and training 
programs targeted at individuals who fit the above categories are suggested as a 
good way to reduce risk. Pollnac and colleagues argue haNesters "fail to take 
enough interest" (153) in learning how to use safety equipment, and suggest 
showing films of vessels sinking and other '"reality-inducing' techniques" to 
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"overcome the denial-trivialization way of thinking sufficiently to enable 
participants to take the safety course materials seriously" (158). Trivialization of 
risk should be taken seriously, and accurate perceptions of risks and how to deal 
with them are necessary. 
The human capital approach is useful in its focus on how individuals can 
take steps to enhance their own safety, but it can also mask some environmental 
and structural influences on the decisions made by harvesters. As such, the next 
section explores the role of structural factors in the fishing safety literature. 
Structural Approach 
Wiseman and Burge (2000) share other researchers' concerns about harvesters' 
failure to use safety equipment. However, their approach also points to the role of 
structural factors in mediating risk. Thus they argue, "[w]ithout absolving 
fishermen of their responsibility to adopt proper safety measures for the safe 
operation of their vessels, other players must recognize their responsibility and 
act decisively" (18). Some harvesters refuse to purchase or wear personal 
flotation devices, arguing that there are few such safety devices that are 
comfortable and safe. From a structural viewpoint, then, the designers of safety 
devices bear some responsibility for risk; safety equipment might save many 
more lives if it is accessible and comfortable to wear while working. Such health 
and safety trade-offs are present in a variety of contexts in fishing, which makes 
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it important to study organizational factors that might mediate compliance with 
safety regulations. 
Several researchers have argued that dynamism and related structural 
changes in the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry in the 1990s need to 
be addressed in efforts to reduce risk (Dyer 2000; Wiseman & Burge 2000). In 
recent years, change has become a significant factor in these and many other 
fisheries. Structural changes that are intended to decrease risk of accident or 
injuries, for example the introduction of Individual Quota systems, may or may 
not in fact result in reduced accident rates. Mitigating factors include the total 
amount of quota that individuals or organizations can aggregate (fisheries with 
clearly specified aggregation limits have seen decreases in fatality rates and 
accidents, whereas fisheries with no restrictions on quota aggregation have not), 
as well as the ownership and control of licenses, given the increasing tendency 
of small vessel owners to work for larger corporations (Windle et al. 2008). 
Cultural Approach 
Cultural research on the fishery primarily examines how particular safety 
issues are identified and addressed, and how other risks seem to be neglected or 
accepted as normal. Boshier (2000) outlines a variety of theoretical approaches 
that are used to understand and explain risk, and illustrates why one group may 
locate risk solely in human error, and another may emphasize the safety culture 
or rapid changes in the industry. Binkley (1995), for example, reports offshore 
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ex-harvesters' stories about their accidents and about leaving the fishery are 
often presented in a personal way, which can mask the ways that management 
policies can cause increased safety risks, stress, and job dissatisfaction. The 
cultural perspective can also partially explain why harvesters use coping 
mechanisms like trivialization and denial. For example, perceptions of risk can 
be critically altered after experience with an accident or injury. Binkley suggests 
that trivialization is an understandable, if not necessary, response to daily 
hazardous work. "Ex-fishers respect and realize why fishers trivialize risks, and 
they discuss those risks because they will never go fishing again" (1995:141 ). 
Prevention of accidents and injuries can be enhanced by closely analyzing 
the work processes in progress at the time of an incident. "Accident statistics 
provide an overview of the number of injuries in this industry compared with other 
industries, but most statistics lack details as to specific working processes and 
fishing methods" (Jensen, Stage, Noer, & Kaerlev 2005: 425). In other words, 
injury statistics presented without the work history are not as meaningful or useful 
as they might otherwise be. Detailed coding of injuries related to the specific 
working processes of various fishing methods can be used for epidemiological 
studies of injuries and dangerous situations on fishing expeditions, and for 
systematizing preventive measures (429). Safety can be increased by providing 
highly detailed accounts of how and why injuries happen, accounting for as many 
factors as possible. 
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Integrated Approach 
Most accidents have no single, simple cause but arise as a result of many 
interacting circumstances (Kietz 1994 ). As a result there are many ways of 
breaking the chain of events that culminates in an accident. Effective prevention 
lies far from the event immediately prior to an accident, and Kletz names several 
factors that can reduce risk. First, he emphasizes the importance of user-friendly 
designs, which will tolerate departures from ideal operation or maintenance 
without an accident occurring. Second, the importance of and need for "hazops" 
(hazard and operability studies) are identified; essentially, these allow the 
stakeholders to maintain a comprehensive perspective on possible danger. Kletz 
also explains that there are several different types of human error, including: 
mistakes, violations, mismatches between ability and job, and slips and lapses of 
attention. Each of these types of error warrants a different type of reaction. He 
argues that no one should accept a reason such as organizational weakness for 
an accident, and says such a statement should be backed up by 
recommendations that specific people should take specific actions to prevent a 
recurrence. Unless this is done, he asserts, the accident is bound to repeat. 
In the United States, Van Noy (1995) applies an injury data framework 
originally developed by Gielen in 1992 to the commercial fishing industry. This 
approach is particularly useful because it entails an analysis of the environmental 
and behavioral determinants of injury, as well as influencing factors that 
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reinforce, predispose, or enable such determinants (21 ). The framework 
includes three streams of intervention planning: engineering/technological, 
legislative/enforcement and educational/behavioral (1995: 21 ). As explained 
earlier in the introduction to the section on approaches to fishing safety, this 
could present a way for experts in different fields (fishing, vessel design, safety 
education, search and rescue, and equipment design, for example) to integrate 
their knowledge into a single framework. Van Noy's research demonstrates the 
value of such integration by encouraging one group of stakeholders to peer-
review the safety conclusions of another group. In this case it was a group of fish 
harvesters reviewing the conclusions of the Coast Guard about assigned 
accident causes, which yielded deeper insights about prevention of injury; 
however, this model could be usefully employed in a variety of contexts. "The 
consolidation of risks, including those that may indirectly impact fishing, into a 
single conceptual framework helps to illustrate these complex interactions, and to 
identify types of regulations that may mitigate such risks" (Windle, Neis, 
Bornstein & Navarro 2006: 15). 
A model to promote implementation of safety measures, developed in 
Sweden (by Torner, Gagner, Nilsson & Nordling 1999), could hold the key to the 
consolidation of multiple risks into a conceptual framework. The model begins 
with a cost-benefit analysis of accidents and safety measures and then illustrates 
how, for example, the purchase of a ladder for embarking/disembarking (cost: 
<$250 US) and the device for safely securing it to the vessel (cost: <$60 US) 
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could prevent the loss of thousands of dollars in lost time and medical expenses 
(97). Part of their intervention model includes a participatory safety inspection, 
highlighting dangers on the vessel and potential ways to mitigate them, and long-
term follow-up to see which safety measures were implemented. A critical 
benefit to this approach is the opportunity for harvesters to identify and express 
issues of concern to them; for example, if a particular regulation is seen as 
presenting a problem in terms of safety, the harvesters can formally discuss the 
issue. 
An Integrated Approach to Fishing Safety 
An integrated approach to safety in fishing is required to prevent safety from 
being seen in isolated ways through the lens of only one approach at a time. 
Speaking from the "Integrated" point of view, individual factors such as a poor fit 
between physiology and work, or human error due to inappropriate perceptions 
of risk or poor training can be seen as potentially interacting with particular 
working conditions in specific organizational frameworks. Researchers exploring 
typical fishing accidents in Scotland (Lawrie, Matheson, Murphy, Ritchie & Bond 
2003), for instance, have found bad weather (biophysical), financial pressures 
(structural) and lack of sleep (human capital} to be among the major contributing 
factors to accidents according to fish harvesters in Scotland. 
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Murray's earlier work on trivialization (Murray & Dolomount 1994) 
suggests that the severity of harm might be downplayed to some extent by 
harvesters. Trivialization did not, however, stand alone. "An added risk recently 
was the fact that because of the restrictions on fishing, many fishermen now go 
to sea alone. In this situation one slip could have serious consequences" 
(Murray 2002: 247). Fishing alone, fishing further from shore, and in vessels that 
are not appropriate for the distances are all rather new developments in this 
Newfoundland and Labrador inshore fishery that have had an impact on fishing 
safety. One harvester in the present study, whose comments we will revisit in 
the results chapter, illustrates this point by suggesting that DFO should 
"alleviate regulations on boat size but not [increase quotas] -we feel 
unsafe, don't need more quota. Crab boats are forced offshore in 34'11 "s 
but they should be in a 45' or 50' boat. That takes years to change and 
shouldn't be out there in those boats but he got to make do with what he 
got" (FH 39). This relatively brief statement unpacks to reveal connections 
between individual choices such as where and when to fish, and structural 
constraints such as quota allotments and vessel length, as well as fishing 
seasons and regions. Regulatory changes may not keep pace with each other 
(boat size vs. fishing region, as indicated above) or changes in fishery conditions. 
An integrated framework can consider different types of factors simultaneously 
without sacrificing an understanding of one for another. 
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Strengths of an Integrated Approach 
Learning more about the complex, interactive causes of accidents and injury can 
help inform policy-makers and practitioners alike. Increasing safety is a win-win 
proposition: in terms of social costs, fewer accidents and injuries mean reduced 
costs for search and rescue, for healthcare, and rehabilitation services. In 
economic terms and within fisheries, it means less lost time and unproductive 
fishing trips, as well as the maintenance of low insurance premiums. In social 
terms, it means fewer individuals and families suffering from an injury or death. 
Before regulations that increase safety can be introduced, it must be 
determined that they do, in fact, reduce risk in some measurable fashion; and 
one of the best ways to do that would be to engage the experience of people who 
are out there, doing the work and seeing risks first hand as well as that of 
experts. Otherwise, the consequence may be that fish harvesters become 
disillusioned with an ever-changing, seemingly meaningless string of policies. 
Only through true collaboration with fish harvesters is it possible to gain insight 
into their everyday working conditions and make the implicit elements of their 
safety decisions explicit for the purposes of increasing safety (Van Nay 1995). In 
addition, such collaboration might also increase the likelihood that new 
regulations will be followed, if harvesters feel engaged and invested in the 
development of policy. 
In an integrated approach like this, it is important to include the strengths 
and insights of biophysical, human capital , structural and cultural research, and 
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account for both behavioral and non-behavioral factors. Wiseman and Burge 
(2000), for example, argue that structural factors have been neglected by the 
Canadian Coast Guard. Van Noy (1995), on the other hand, suggests that the 
U.S. Coast Guard, in its routine analyses of accidents at sea, tends to emphasize 
structural factors such as vessel safety and Search and Rescue operations to the 
exclusion of acknowledging the role that human actors play. 
One way to understand and apply harvesters' practical knowledge about 
fishing safety is by using the method developed by Torner, Cagner, Nilsson and 
Nordling (1999). The process includes: (a) thorough research on the types and 
frequencies of different kinds of accidents in a particular fishing region; (b) 
systematic visits by safety experts to identify technical shortcomings onboard 
vessels; (c) short-term follow-up communication with harvesters by such experts 
to reveal whether action was taken about identified shortcomings, as well as 
harvesters' reasons for compliance or noncompliance; and (d) long-term 
communication with harvesters about safety. The long-term communication is a 
key aspect of the method, as it can address the dynamism of the industry as well 
as the interactivity of risk factors; furthermore, such communication could present 
a way to incorporate information about near-misses and otherwise unreported 
incidents. The majority of the harvesters who completed such communications 
were appreciative of the 'face time' with safety experts; this interaction would 
permit the harvesters to add their voices to the safety discourse. 
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The next chapter describes the research method used in this study. We 
begin with a brief examination of the focus groups, information from which was 
used to devise some of the questions in the phone interviews. Because the 
phone interview was the main research instrument, I explore its creation and 
delivery in greater detail than the other methods. 
42 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter examines the methodological approaches and issues 
associated with this study. First, I outline the conceptual design of the project, 
explaining the rationale and the overall approach. Next, I describe the 
development of the interview schedule and instrument, including the selection of 
telephone interviews as the delivery mode. After that, I will elaborate on the 
sampling process, ethical concerns, and the process of data collection and 
analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of the 
research, and the limitations of the study. 
Rationale 
My research privileges and also scrutinizes Newfoundland fish harvesters' 
knowledge. One goal of this study is to examine their beliefs about safety in a 
way that picks up on commonality and diversity among groups of harvesters (for 
example, younger and older harvesters). It makes sense to include their 
experience and points of view in an investigation of fishing safety because they 
are the people who go out to sea and have direct experiential knowledge of what 
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fishing involves, conditions under which it takes place (physical, regulatory, 
economic, social, technical), and within those conditions, things that help them to 
fish safely and that encourage them to take chances with their health and safety. 
Finding ways to enhance occupational health and safety in commercial fishing is 
particularly challenging because tension can exist between conservation rules, 
safety regulations, and the technological and training requirements for safe 
fishing. Added to these challenges, fish harvesters often feel targeted and 
misunderstood by regulators they sometimes blame for increasing risk. 
My point of view as a social science researcher permits me to create a 
third kind of knowledge: neither practitioner nor industry regulator, I can compare 
harvesters' knowledge to what has been published by regulators and analyze 
what each group says about safety to find commonalities and differences. As 
outlined in the literature review, I acknowledge that notions of risk are socially 
constructed and not simply something obvious or 'objective' that can be simply 
observed. However, that criticism could paralyze efforts to analyze which 
factors contribute to safer fishing. Therefore, like Sjoberg, "I presume that 'there 
is something out there' and that some statements about that something are 
better than others. It is our job to improve on statements about risk reduction" 
(2000: 412). Examining the similarities and differences in the positions taken by 
different social groups, including harvesters, and combining insights from those 
groups can help bring us closer to that 'something that is out there' (Neis et al., 
1999). 
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A second goal of this research is to investigate which factors may protect 
or endanger fish harvesters, as well as how these factors interact. For example, 
we want to know more about how policies that regulate fishing affect safety and, 
if so, which regulatory agencies are affecting safety and how. This is important 
because the risks harvesters face are shaped to some extent by policy-makers in 
various government departments, whether or not those departments have any 
legislative responsibility for safety. 
Sometimes harvesters' resistance to particular regulations is glossed over: 
Dayton (1998) says "regulations often are barely tolerated" (821) by harvesters. 
Sociological research that draws on fish harvesters' perceptions of risk and 
expert knowledge can help to illuminate how and why harvesters might resist 
particular regulations. Research like this can also identify ways of expressing 
and then meeting the goals of all parties involved. Participation by fish harvesters 
in the risk knowledge creation process can help ensure that safety measures are 
pertinent and practical (Torner, M., Gagner, M., Nilsson, B., & Nordling, P-0. 
1999) 
Selection of Delivery Mode: Telephone Interviews 
The focus groups provided a broad overview of the issues that harvesters felt are 
important to fishing safety. Given that the nature of focus groups is a give-and-
take discussion, and that a snowball-sampling strategy was used, we felt a 
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telephone interview with a stratified random sample would work best for 
achieving findings that might be more evenly applicable within and between 
fisheries. It is possible that the contacts who invited other harvesters to take part 
only invited those who shared their point of view. A more random sample of 
harvesters for the interviews could ensure that we would not encounter the same 
potential bias in both components of the research. The information gathered with 
focus groups gave us a good idea of the significant issues such as regulations 
and training; we wanted to explore some of them more deeply in a more 
structured way, while making sure respondents had ample opportunity to express 
themselves. I was present at one focus group in which one individual dominated 
the conversation, raising his voice to speak over the facilitator and other 
participants in the focus group. 
A telephone interview was an inclusive research instrument for our 
purposes because it permitted us to reach fish harvesters around the province. 
As in the case of McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker's study, "in addition to their 
extremely variable schedules, the participants in our study lived hundreds of 
miles away from us and from each other" (2000: 71 ). Traveling to interview 
harvesters face-to-face would have required extensive commitments of time and 
money, without offering significant advantages compared to interviewing over the 
phone. Compared to mail-out surveys, completion rates tend to be higher over 
the telephone, and delivering it this way also helps encourage the participation of 
those who might be intimidated by a lengthy paper survey (Marcus & Crane 
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1986). This is particularly important in an industry where many of the older 
harvesters left school at a young age to go fishing (Fagan 1998), and where 
literacy skills are not considered as important as having a strong back and good 
work ethic. That said, for younger harvesters, as we will explore in the data 
chapter, education has become a kind of insurance in an industry that is 
becoming increasingly insecure. 
Development of the Interview Schedule 
The phone interviews that constitute the core of the data used here composed 
the second stage of a multi-phased Perceptions of Risk component of 
SafeCatch. The first phase consisted of 17 focus groups carried out around the 
island of Newfoundland in 2003. Contacts at the Professional Fish Harvesters 
Certification Board (PFHCB) and the Fish, Food and Allied Workers (FFAW) 
union identified members of the community they considered knowledgeable 
about fishing safety (typically those who were involved in offering safety courses) 
and gave us their phone numbers. Participants in these focus groups were 
asked to discuss broad questions about their experience with risky situations, 
whether and how risks to fishermen have changed over time, and whether things 
like training and regulations affect safety. Responses to these questions helped 
to identify specific areas of interest that we explored in a more structured way 
with interviews. 
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Interviews have the potential to add to the understanding of risk and 
perceptions of risk emerging from the focus groups in several ways. Interviewing 
harvesters in a one-on-one interview could result in different kinds of answers 
than we might get in a group context. For example, harvesters might not mention 
dangerous practices if they knew that some of the other focus group participants 
had engaged in that behavior. In addition, group conversations can sometimes 
be sidetracked by one or two individuals who are relatively more vocal than the 
others; one-on-one interviews permit interested respondents to express all of 
their comments and concerns and to have more control over the flow of the 
interview (along with the researchers) (see Sica 2006 for a complete review of 
the comparative benefits and disadvantages of focus groups, surveys and 
interviews). Semi-structured interviews offer some of the benefits of 
standardization and comparability, while still offering a way for qualitative 
information to be included (Marcus & Crane 1986). 
Questions for the interview schedule were developed by modifying a 
questionnaire that had been used in Binkley's (1994) study of offshore fishing 
safety, as well as through insights from the focus groups. New questions and 
answer options were introduced so that the inshore and midshore fleet 
information would make sense. Our interview schedule was pre-tested with five 
harvesters, and adjusted and shortened after each pre-test. We changed some 
questions to increase respondents' comfort level and to lessen any sense of 
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intrusion; for example, we decided not to ask for specific information on income 
and enterprise value, but rather to inquire about broad categories in these areas. 
Outline of Interview Sections 
The questions in the final version of the schedule were broken down into 
several major sections including questions on work experience and job 
satisfaction, as well as experience with and importance ratings for various types 
of training and equipment. We also included a few questions about health and a 
number of multi-part questions on accident and injury history. The interview 
questions focused on the last 1 0 years, primarily because we were interested in 
changes over the last decade; this period included substantial spatial, fishing 
gear and technological changes as well as regulatory changes and changes in 
fishing location and conditions associated with the closure of the cod fishery in 
1992. The effects of the subsequent shifts in effort are a central focus of the 
larger Safe Catch project. 
To give the answers some social and economic context, we inquired about 
their family, their income level and their enterprise value. In terms of inquiring 
about job satisfaction, many factors influence harvesters' expressed levels of 
fulfillment. Dramatic changes in the industry over time could potentially have 
dramatic effects on satisfaction, so we asked how satisfied they were with their 
jobs compared to 10 years ago. We also asked whether they would encourage 
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their children to fish for a living (hypothetically for those without children) as a 
long-term gauge of satisfaction and hope for the future of the industry. As the 
final question, we asked, "If you had your life to live over, would you go into 
fishing again?" as one way to determine a 'bottom line' of satisfaction. The 
following section briefly describes each section of the interview schedule. 
The first section, Questions 1 to 18, inquired about demographic and 
background information. Questions covered the respondents' age, marital 
status, the number and age of their children (if applicable), as well as when the 
respondent had started fishing and their region of residence. Questions 11 to 18 
established the context for their work in fishing: which sectors they had worked 
in, licenses held, species targeted, their general level of education and their 
fisheries-specific training. 
The second section, Questions 19 to 42, focused on the vessels 
respondents had worked on in 2004 (the last full calendar year before the 
research was carried out) . Questions 20 through 36 dealt with the vessel they 
spent the most time on in that year. This section covered vessel length and 
design and the types of fishing gear used. It also inquired about navigational, 
communication and safety equipment onboard, as well as the frequency of safety 
drills. Questions 37 to 42 asked about position on the vessel, how many crew 
were usually onboard, and whether or not family members worked on the vessel 
with the respondent. 
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Questions 43 through 47 dealt with harvesters' perceptions of risk, and 
included open-ended questions as well as lists of technical, social, regulatory and 
personal factors ranked in order of importance to fishing safety on a scale of 1 to 
5 (1 being not important to fishing safety, and 5 being extremely important to 
fishing safety). 
Questions 48 through 51 asked about their experience with risky situations 
in the past 10 years (for example, whether they had been on board when the 
engine failed, or fallen overboard) and whether such experiences had changed 
their attitude towards safety. 
Questions 52 through 55 dealt with specific safety equipment, practices 
and regulations. Question 52 listed 29 items that may be found on a fishing 
vessel (items such as GPS and Life raft) and asked respondents to rate their 
importance to safety on a scale of 1 to 5. Question 53.01 to 53.14 asked for the 
same rating scale applied to regulations - gear-setting rules and vessel-length 
restrictions, for example- and boat factors as well (e.g. , age, maintenance and 
design of the boat). Questions 54 and 55 asked whether harvesters perceived 
certain vessels or fisheries to be more unsafe than others. 
The sixth section, 56 to 72, asked about accidents and injuries at sea, 
including what types of injury might be expected as a normal part of fishing. 
Question 57 asked how many accidents the respondent had experienced during 
the past decade, and we inquired into the context and details of the most severe 
accident reported (if any). 
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Questions 73 to 77 inquired about marine and land-based weather 
forecasts: how often respondents check them, which sources they use, and how 
accurate the forecasts have been in their area over time. 
Question 78.01 to 78.20 covers job satisfaction, listing social, personal, 
financial and regulatory factors that we asked respondents to rate on a scale of 1 
to 5 (1 being very dissatisfied and 5 being very satisfied). We also asked about 
their overall satisfaction with fishing as a job, and their satisfaction now 
compared to 1 0 years ago. 
Questions 79 through 81 ask how the respondents were paid for their 
work in 2004 and into which income bracket they fit. This section also inquired 
about the investment and possible return from their enterprise, if applicable. 
Questions 82 to 89, the final section, asked about health and family. 
Questions 82 to 85 inquire whether they feel they have any health problems 
related to fishing. Questions 86 to 89 ask how often their family worries about 
them while fishing, and whether/how their worry has changed over the past 10 
years. The last two questions ask if their family would rather see them in a 
different occupation and whether they would go into fishing again if they had their 
life to live over. 
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Sample 
Our original goal was to survey a random sample of 1 00 professional fish 
harvesters stratified on the basis of region and on the basis of level of 
professional certification. To find our sample, we asked the Professional Fish 
Harvesters' Certification Board (PFHCB) to generate a stratified random sample 
of 600 names from its list of professional fish harvesters. The stratification was 
based on the level of professionalization, including Apprentice, Level I and Level 
II harvesters. The purpose of the stratification was to ensure we got responses 
from harvesters who had been in the industry for many years, as well as from 
those who have just entered. We wanted the sample to include women as well, 
but we did not receive enough responses from women to make a meaningful 
analysis of the effects of gender. This could be for a variety of reasons; for 
example, women in the fishery often feel like they are under surveillance for 
Employment Insurance reasons (Grzetic 2004). 
The PFHCB mailed a package to each of these 600 individuals containing 
an information sheet about the study (included as Appendix A), a letter 
requesting their participation (included as Appendix 8), a letter of support from 
the PFHCB, a contact reply form and a stamped, self-addressed envelope for 
use by those interested in participating. The harvesters were asked to return the 
form to SafetyNet. We were not able to contact the harvesters directly because 
the PFHCB could not release its list of names and addresses of professional fish 
harvesters for privacy reasons. Fish harvesters who were interested in 
53 
participating returned the self-addressed, stamped envelope and were contacted 
by an interviewer over the telephone to schedule an interview. During the initial 
telephone call the interviewer read a script that asked for oral consent in addition 
to the written consent received via contact reply forms. The oral consent 
document is included as Appendix C. 
Unfortunately, after the first mail-out of 600 packages, we received only 35 
responses, and from these were able to complete 25 phone interviews. We 
attempted to increase our response rate by asking the PFHCB to send a second 
package of information to the same sample in September. We received 19 
responses to this second mail-out and, from these, managed to complete an 
additional 15 interviews. The 14 harvesters who returned a contact reply form, 
but did not complete the interview, generally experienced some sort of 
scheduling conflict due to personal travel or fishing. 
The Principal Investigator of the project, Dr. Barbara Neis, also discussed 
the research during a radio interview with the host of CBC's Fisheries Broadcast 
during which we issued an invitation to harvesters to participate. This 
advertisement generated an additional three responses (calls to a confidential toll 
free line) of which all three led to completed interviews. In light of the overall low 
response rate to these multiple initiatives, we revisited the last few pre-test 
interviews we had conducted using a version of the interview schedule that was 
very close to the final version and, with the permission of those three individuals, 
re-classified their interviews from pre-test to test interviews. Thus, the total 
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number of completed interviews for this research is 46. Selected data from these 
are the focus of analysis in the remainder of the thesis. 
We initially attributed the low response rate to political turmoil in the 
industry that erupted in the snow crab fishery around the time of the mail-out, and 
to the fact that the mail-out took place in the spring after many harvesters were 
back fishing. I also believe that harvesters in Newfoundland have become 
somewhat wary of anything that might increase their costs, and some harvesters 
remarked after the interviews that they hoped their participation was not going to 
be used as justification to bring in more mandatory training or equipment. We 
also faced the challenge of getting respondents to mail in a consent form, and 
then set up a time to do the interview. Participation might have been much 
higher if we could have traveled to the communities, explained the study in 
person and had them sign a consent form at that time; however, time and budget 
constraints prevented this. 
Every member of the population theoretically had the possibility of being 
included in the sample (Henry 1990), because the PFHCB drew our sample from 
its list of certified harvesters. After the completion of the study, I spoke with the 
Executive Director of PFHCB who said that our sample and findings appeared to 
be fairly representative of harvesters in his experience; however, some 
information about the harvester population such as their overall level of formal 
education, is "virtually impossible to ascertain" (M. Dolomount, personal 
communication, December 12, 2007). The stratified random sample for this 
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study is not large enough to be statistically representative of the entire harvester 
population, but it is a very important source of information (Dorofeev & Grant 
2006) about harvesters' observations and understandings of the risks they face, 
factors that appear to influence these understandings, and about their job 
satisfaction. It also provides insight into the interactive nature of the factors that 
affect risk, and how such risk might be reduced. 
Ethical Considerations 
Full ethics approval was received on March 17, 2005 from the Human 
Investigation Committee in Memorial University's Faculty of Medicine. As part of 
the process, we agreed to obtain free and informed consent from the interview 
participants in the form of oral consent prior to the phone interview initiated 
following receipt of a voluntarily returned contact reply form. 
Appropriate care is being taken to ensure that none of the participants' 
rights such as their rights to confidentiality and anonymity are violated. Data are 
stored in a password-protected computer folder and a locked cabinet in secure 
storage, and only approved members of the research team have access to 
personal information. I assigned numbers to the completed interviews, and these 
documents are stored separately from the master list of names and interview 
numbers. Names are not used in any reports and identifying details are altered 
where necessary so that as much anonymity as possible is retained in the work. 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
In total, I carried out 46 telephone interviews between May 2005 and 
January 2006. Two researchers participated in each interview: I asked the 
questions and recorded the answers to the quantitative questions, and a 
research assistant captured qualitative answers as well as extra remarks or 
'asides'. Having an assistant present helped ensure more of the information was 
captured, compensating for the decision not to audio-tape. It also helped the 
interviews flow more like conversations because I did not have to pause to write 
down extra comments. 
Many of the questions had between 1 0 to 30 items that we wanted to 
know about, so we created 5 point psychological rating scales for these 
questions (e.g. "1 is not at all important, 2 is slightly important, 3 is important, 4 is 
very important and 5 is extremely important.") These have been used 
extensively in previous research on perceptions of risk (see Sjoberg 1994; 1987). 
My supervisory committee and I debated whether or not I could use this 
information in a 'quantitative' way, realizing that such scales are not interval 
measurements and thus calculations like mean and standard deviation are not 
statistically viable. However, some researchers have argued that such rating 
scales show similar trends to those found in more detailed, statistically 
sophisticated measurements, without bogging down the participants in complex 
details: 
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In a methodological study, I investigated the properties of various 
response formats used for studying risk perception (Sjoberg, 1994). 
It was found that all formats gave essentially linearly related results, 
but that some of them gave data which were more efficient to 
discriminate among hazards. Category scales with a limited 
number of response categories, say 5 or 7, appear to be preferable 
(Sjoberg, 2000: 411 ). 
For simplicity's sake, in the presentation of the data I will refer to the "average" 
satisfaction, danger rating, and importance rating, anywhere a psychological 
rating scale was used. The term carries with it the understanding that it is not an 
interval category and therefore the results cannot be considered statistically 
significant. However, because "psychological rating scales give close enough 
approximations to interval scales" (Sjoberg, 2000:41 0), this terminology will help 
streamline the presentation of results. 
To make the results more vivid, I have created character composites using 
the template of "imaginary CVs" developed by Rickard (2001 ). Her work dealt 
with sex workers in the U.K., which at first glance may seem very different from 
commercial fishing work. What is similar between the occupations, and helps us 
present the data here in a clear way, is the attention that the imaginary CV pays 
to "working in different 'work sites' or settings and to those at different stages of 
their 'careers"' (2001 :115). These are both industries where workers usually do 
not have traditional 9-5 workdays, and typically their worksites can change. 
Workers in these industries tend to be mobile and dynamic, and that's why 
Rickard's use of imaginary CVs is useful here. The CV helps to holistically 
picture the worker as a situated, social being: 
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I chose this format of presentation as a novel way to conceptualize 
sex work as a job in the context of a whole life. The aim was to 
summarize the range of work experiences that each person 
described and to introduce people's own reflections about their 
working lives and their futures in their own words. 
The CVs are then 'imagined' and narrative-based, differing 
from a conventional curriculum vitae in both purpose and writing 
style (Rickard 2001 :116). 
Furthermore, the stress and potentially risky nature of the work are important 
common elements between the occupations. This suggests that a tool useful for 
analyzing work in the sex industry could be very useful in analyzing fishing. 
Importance and Limitations 
One of the strengths of this research lies in its ability to bring together insights 
from different groups; this begins to close some gaps that exist between 
harvesters and regulators. Furthermore, this type of research gives harvesters 
an active voice in the process, rather than treating them as passive yet resistant 
'receptors' of safety research findings. 
We did not interview enough fish harvesters to ensure any of our findings 
are statistically significant or generalizable to the larger population of fish 
harvesters in Newfoundland and Labrador. Our results are not 'wrong' simply 
because we do not have a large enough sample to generalize; however, we 
certainly may have a tendency to highlight some issues that are especially 
important to the group that did participate (Henry 1990). Related to this, it is 
possible that the people who volunteered to do an interview may in some way be 
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different from those who did not. One possibility is that those who volunteered 
may be the ones who do everything 'by the book,' as those who deviate may 
have been nervous about taking part. Alternatively, the people who volunteered 
for a safety study may be those who felt strongly- negatively or positively -
about the way the fishery is managed. Many of the harvesters expressed 
discontent, even anger, over some of the rules and decisions made by regulatory 
agencies. 
When we asked the PFHCB to compile a stratified random sample, we 
asked them to specifically include women. Only one woman responded, so 
gender is unfortunately not a variable of analysis in this thesis. In future 
research, it would be interesting to see whether women perform the same tasks 
onboard, and what kinds of risks they face when they do. Grzetic (2004) has 
written about women's experiences in the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries, 
and points out the additional pressures of performing household and family work 
as well. 
Summary 
This chapter has explained how the research was designed, the development of 
the research instrument and its delivery, highlighting some of the strengths as 
well as the limitations of the study. The next chapter begins by summarizing the 
demographics of the harvesters who responded. The trends and patterns in the 
responses to the substantive questions demonstrate where the major dividing 
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lines are between the different social cohorts who participated. To conceptualize 
these groups, I will borrow Wendy Rickard's template for "imaginary CVs" which 
helps to put a face to the statistics about, and quotes by, typical harvesters I 
interviewed. Following the presentation of the data, I will examine the links and 
indications of interactive effects between the factors we found in the data. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
This chapter begins by describing the demographic characteristics of the 
participant harvesters, including their ages, job tenure (or years spent fishing) , 
where they fish, their vessels, and the species they targeted in 2004. The next 
section presents harvesters' comments on the physical and environmental risks 
that make fishing an inherently dangerous job. We then look at what, at the time 
of the interview, harvesters had done to protect their safety: their level of training, 
the safety equipment they carried, and their ideas about using "common sense." 
The next section looks at their experience with accidents and injuries and what 
they had to say about what puts them at risk. The chapter concludes with three 
"imaginary CV's" (Rickard 2001) designed to identify clusters of harvesters with 
shared experiences and perceptions of risk. Chapter Five links the findings and 
clusters of harvesters to the different approaches to fishing safety identified in 
Chapter Two highlighting the importance of using an integrated framework for 
assessing safety and perceptions of risk. 
Demographic Data 
In 2001, fifty-seven percent of fish harvesters in Canada had less than high 
school graduation, compared with twenty percent of the overall labor force 
(Praxis 2005: 12). For the employment category "Fishing vessel masters and 
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skippers and fishermen" in Newfoundland, there were 8010 males and 1835 
females (Statistics Canada, 2001 Census of Population). 
For this study, I interviewed 45 males and one female, all of whom resided 
in Newfoundland at the time of the interview and were registered with the 
Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board. Forty-one (or 89%) were 
married or living common-law, and only five (11 %) were single. Forty (87%) had 
children who ranged in age from two weeks to 42 years. The average current 
age of the fish harvesters was 47, with ages ranging from 22 to 67 years. They 
had been fishing for an average of 31 years, with the least experienced 
respondent having fished three years, and the most experienced having fished 
53 years. In terms of education, 41 percent (n = 19) had not graduated high 
school, 37 percent (n = 17) had graduated high school, and 22 percent (n = 1 0) 
had some kind of post-secondary education. 
Harvesters ranged from inshore lobster fishermen who fish alone to 
officers on large offshore ships with 35 crewmembers. Roughly 65 percent of 
harvesters who took part (30 of 46) were skippers, with the remaining 16 working 
as regular crewmembers. As Figure 1 illustrates, the majority of the vessels that 
respondents spent most of their time on were in the 24' to 34' 11" sector, but we 
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Figure 1: Number of vessels in each fleet 
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The length of vessel is linked to the species fished. For example, lobster is not 
often fished from a large vessel, and likewise it would be unusual - but not 
unheard of - to fish snow crab in a small boat. The species targeted in 2004 by 
the harvesters are detailed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Species targeted by participants in 2004 
Of the harvesters we interviewed, none fished eel. "Othspec" refers to other 
species, which include swordfish and tuna. The top three targeted species were 
snow crab (n = 33), cod (n = 26) and seal (n = 23). Over 70 percent of our 
respondents targeted snow crab. 
Most of the harvesters we interviewed fished in the Eastern region (n = 
22), and 10 fished from the Central region. Eight of the harvesters fished from 
Northern Newfoundland or Labrador and only four respondents fished out of the 
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Western region. Two harvesters fished out of multiple regions, as illustrated in 
Figure 3: 








Figure 3: Fishing area in Newfoundland 
The distribution of the harvesters' region of residence was the same as above, 
except that the two harvesters who fished out of multiple regions resided in the 
Eastern region. 
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An Inherently Dangerous Job 
As explained in Chapter Two, fishing is a dangerous occupation. The biophysical 
approach to fishing safety emphasizes the inherent risks associated with working 
in remote locations, hazardous conditions, dealing with uncertainty and the 
possibilities of bad weather. Workers are out at sea, exposed to the elements, 
with nowhere to hide when the weather turns bad or the vessel is damaged. In 
addition, roughly 24 percent (n=11) of respondents said that they fish alone or 
with one other person, which can increase risk if an emergency occurs: "I used 
to fish by myself - you could have a heart attack" (FH 45). Working alone in 
a remote location could increase the danger faced and/or perceived by 
harvesters. 
As seen in Figure 2, over 40 percent of harvesters said that they targeted 
seal in 2004; of the 19 harvesters who said one fishery was particularly 
dangerous, 11 named sealing. Specific risks they identified include ice damage 
to the vessel, lack of regulations, and the use of high-powered rifles in close 
proximity and low visibility. One harvester left sealing because of the danger 
posed by potentially untrained gunners using high-powered rifles: "a bullet can 
go a long way. I gave it up because it was too dangerous" (FH 20). 
When asked, "Do you think fishing is more dangerous, the same, or less 
dangerous than most other jobs?" 37 (80%) of harvesters said "more dangerous," 
eight (17%) said "the same," and only one said "less dangerous." 
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Some respondents elaborated on their answer: "more dangerous - very 
dangerous, but if you're trained it's not as dangerous as it could be" (FH 
25); another added: "more dangerous- the sea can break on you, break 
your neck" (FH 42). Similarly, another harvester replied "the same, more 
dangerous than a good many [other jobs] if you're careless" (FH 44). Only one 
harvester diverged from the consensus, saying it's "the same or even less 
[dangerous]; I don't play that up" (FH 41 ). This particular fisherman had been 
fishing for 42 years when we interviewed him (on the conservative side of his 
estimate - he said he'd been fishing since he was "13 or 14") and fishes with his 
two grown children. This finding supports work that suggests those who have 
been fishing longer and fish with family are more likely to trivialize dangers 
(Murray & Dolomount, 1994). This harvester fishes with both his son and 
daughter. Out of the ten harvesters who fish with a son or daughter, the other 
nine said that they perceive fishing to be more dangerous than other jobs. Thus, 
the trivializing harvester fits with Murray and Dolomount's predicted pattern, but 
he does not represent harvesters who fish with their children as a whole. 
Their Experience with Risky Situations Accidents and Injuries 
We set out to explore harvesters' personal experience with accidents, injuries, 
and risky situations and the relationship between this experience and their 
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perceptions of risk. To open this section of the interview, we asked harvesters 
whether they had been in certain risky situations any time over the last 1 0 years. 
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Many harvesters had experienced "being onboard in extreme weather" (n = 39, 
or 85%), "being towed in" (n = 36, or 78%), and engine failure (n = 31 , or 67%). 
In the 10 years prior to the interview, none of the respondents had experienced a 
collision, the (emergency) use of a lifeboat, or had had to abandon ship. 
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If harvesters said that they had had an accident in the last 10 years, we 
asked how many accidents they had in total over that time span. Although 50 
percent (n=23) of the harvesters had experienced an accident, only 4 percent 
had three or more accidents in the last 10 years. This may, however, reflect the 
tendency of harvesters to downplay the seriousness of certain incidents: one 
fisherman said that he'd had no accidents in the past 10 years, just "cut fingers 
and broken legs every now and then" (FH 04)! Some also mentioned 
incidents that had happened previous to this ten-year period, but these were not 
within the scope of the present study. Of the 23 accidents reported, 39 percent 
occurred in summer, 17 percent in fall, 9 percent in winter and 35 percent in 
spring. A full 91 percent of accidents happened during daylight hours, and in 74 
percent of cases visibility was clear. Only 9 percent happened during high winds, 
while 52 percent occurred when it was calm. 57 percent of the accidents were 
aboard vessels less than 35', 17 percent aboard vessels 35' -44' 11" and 17 
percent aboard vessels in the 45' -64' 11 " sectors; 9 percent occurred on ships 
over 65'. Of the 23 accidents, four occurred while docked. 
Of the 23 harvesters who held a license for snow crab in 2004, 12 of them 
(or roughly 52%) had experienced an accident in the past decade. Indeed, 
almost half ( 4 7%) of the 19 accidents that occurred at sea happened while 
fishing snow crab. Of the 14 harvesters who held cod licenses in 2004, seven 
had experienced an accident in the last ten years, and 21 percent of accidents 
that we heard about occurred while fishing cod. The few remaining incidents 
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were fairly evenly dispersed among harvesters pursuing scallop, seals and 
lumpfish. 
In terms of the most severe accidents over the period of 1994-2004 that 
were mentioned by harvesters, 74 percent resulted in injuries, but none required 
Coast Guard or Search and Rescue assistance. Seven injured fishers, or 37 
percent, had to take time off from fishing (between four days and six months) 
because of their injuries, and five applied for Workers' Compensation. Many 
incidents go unreported: a full 18 of the 23 reported in our study, or 78 percent. 
What Do They Do About Safety? 
The human capital approach to fishing safety focuses on improving safety 
training and safety equipment in order to reduce risk. According to the 
International Labour Organization, professionalization is necessary to provide 
fish harvesters with a standardized background in safety (Work in Fishing 
Recommendation, 2007). This process requires workers at sea to do certain 
courses before they can become a credentialed member of a fishing crew. 
In 2004, Canadian deckhands were required to have completed a Marine 
Emergency Duties course. The MEDA 1 course is intended for those harvesters 
working outside 20 miles, and the MEDA3 is designed for those working inside 
20 miles. The MED course had to be completed by the time the deckhand had 
completed six months' service. Similarly, captains could skipper a vessel up to 
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60 gross tons with the MED and the radio-operator certificate required by 
Industry Canada. Skippers of vessels larger than 60 gross tons needed Fishing 
Master IV, Ill , II , or I (Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters 2006). 
Thirty-one of forty-six harvesters, or 67 percent, had completed the Basic 
Survival Training course, which is accepted as meeting the requirements of the 
Transport Canada MED A 1 course. Thirty-one harvesters had completed a 
Marine Emergency Duties course, and 16 had Fishing Master designation at the 
time of the interview. A few had also completed courses related to safety in 
areas like small-engine repair and firefighting, and three did the four-year 
Nautical Science program at the Marine Institute. To gauge their perceptions of 
the importance of such training, we asked fish harvesters "how important is 
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Figure 5: Importance of training grouped by age of respondents 
The percentage of harvesters who feel training is "extremely important" 
• Not Important 
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decreased with age, with over half of each age group younger than 50 years old 
selecting that option, and only approximately one third of the 60 or older category 
selecting it Similarly, no one under the age of 40 felt that training is "not 
important" or "slightly important," while over 10 percent of those between 50 to 59 
years felt it was only "slightly important" Possible reasons for this will be 
explored in the next chapter_ 
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The sixth figure illustrates the perceptions of the importance of safety 
training with harvesters separated into two groups: the first had not completed a 
Basic Safety Training or Marine Emergency Duties course, and the second group 
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Figure 6: Importance of safety training grouped by level of training 
We can see here that only one person said safety training is "not important," and 
that person had completed neither a BST nor MED course. On the other hand, 
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35 of 39 harvesters who had completed one of the courses said that safety 
training is "very important" or "extremely important". 
Figure 7 illustrates the safety equipment carried onboard as well as the 
number of harvesters who report knowing how to use each type of equipment: 
Safety Equipment and Knowledge 
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Figure 7: Knowledge of safety equipment vs. equipment's presence onboard 
Overall, the majority of harvesters (over 70%) knew how to use the equipment 
we inquired about. Flares were the only piece of equipment we inquired about 
that was present on all respondents' vessels. Two harvesters reported not 
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knowing how to use them. With some equipment, like life-rafts, Personal 
Flotation Devices (PFDs), flotation suits and immersion suits, roughly 20 percent 
more respondents knew how to use each than had the equipment onboard. This 
may be explained by the use of such equipment in training courses by crew on 
smaller vessels, even though their vessels are not required to carry it onboard. 
"Life jacket" was the only item in which the number of people who had it on board 
matched the number of people who reported knowing how to use it. 
Common Sense and Experience 
Many of the harvesters we interviewed agreed that the individual worker 
has a significant effect on safety. One fisherman acknowledged that personal 
awareness of risk plays an important role in staying safe. While explaining how a 
crew member fell into the hold and injured himself, he attributed it to 
"carelessness- the hold should have been closed. [There's a] person to 
do particular jobs on the boat, [but] we never had a hatch before. One's 
responsibility is checking oil, and so on. Nobody really geared in to [that] 
risky responsibility" (FH 44). As this comment illustrates, safety knowledge is 
linked to past experience with the risk of human error going up when harvesters 
find themselves in new situations such as this example, where the addition of a 
deck to their boat introduced the new risk of falling into an open hatch. 
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Experience and common sense also come into play in terms of weather 
forecasting. Harvesters reported creating their own forecasts, either through 
traditional methods like watching the clouds, or by compiling satellite and radar 
maps from several sources and creating their own composites. All 46 harvesters 
reported consulting several sources for the forecast, with most sources being 
checked several times per day. 
In terms of forecasting, one harvester expressed concern: "when the new 
one is issued, you'd think it was two different parts of the world. The 
forecast isn't accurate until the last minute- like someone else switched 
shifts and interpreted the same forecast different" (FH 28). Other harvesters 
vehemently agreed : 
Throw down the piece of paper that buddy's reading off in the 
news room. It's been the same for the last four years. They call 
for east winds and we get west winds, and they call for west 
and we get east. They don't have anything at stake on the 
water so they don't care if the weather forecasts are right or 
wrong. It changes everything for us when we are out on the 
open water, everything (FH 08). 
Several older harvesters mentioned the importance of traditional forecasting 
methods. One fisherman indicated that the decline of traditional knowledge can 
increase dependence on external technology or knowledge at the expense of 
traditional knowledge passed down through generations: "a lot of young people 
can't determine the change of clouds. Traditional ways of telling the 
weather are always better, it seems" (FH 42). 
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Skipper Effect 
Although the role of the skipper did not emerge as a primary issue, there were a 
few respondents who felt it was worth mentioning. For example, when we asked: 
"In your opinion, is there one fishery that is more dangerous than the others?" 
one harvester replied, "No, I don't think one is more dangerous than the 
other. I think all of it has to do with who the skipper of the boat is. If you 
are smart about it, then it should work out fine" (FH 08). 
Having greenhorns onboard is seen as a natural, necessary procedure, as 
all harvesters have to begin fishing some time. However, when they are around, 
the skipper and other crew "got to keep a good eye on him" (FH 23) to make 
sure the new member performs relatively safe tasks and remains out of harm's 
way. Proper supervision can put "a lot of pressure on the skipper" (FH 45), 
and this is of particular concern if there are two or more greenhorns on the 
vessel. 
External Actors 
As explained in Chapter Two, the human capital approach seems to be the 
dominant worldview in fishing safety management. Regulatory agencies view 
training as one of the most important ways of reducing risk at sea, and from this 
perspective accidents are often attributed to human error. External actors, such 
as regulators, garnered the most attention and comments from harvesters, as 
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well as the lowest satisfaction scores. Most haNesters feel that certain 
regulations are placing substantial, unnecessary economic constraints on their 
safety decisions. They feel they are being forced to equip their vessels with 
particular kinds of safety equipment, with the consequence that they cannot 
afford some equipment they feel would be more useful to them. One fisherman 
expressed this heatedly: "[I] don't mind safety [equipment], but there's a lot 
of bullshit" (FH 29). For example, the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS, or 
commonly referred to as "black boxes"), is an electronic automatic location and 
communication device, placed aboard a fishing vessel to manage certain 
fisheries; it monitors time, date, vessel position, and vessel identification number 
in real time through satellites. This information can be used in two ways: to 
respond to distress calls (safety), or to monitor if the vessel is within its 
appropriate fishing areas (suNeillance). HaNesters question the need for such 
black boxes, when they already have to pay for fisheries obseNers and dockside 
monitoring: "That's stuff put on fishermen by DFO. We don't need it 
because we're monitored. We have to pay for them to sit on their asses 
and monitor us. Feel like a prisoner, it doesn't help safety." (FH 29). Thus, 
to this fisherman, some 'safety' equipment is perceived as a mechanism of 
suNeillance. 
Vessel length restrictions are also seen as having a major impact on 
safety. Boat owners are trying to increase the working space or hold capacity of 
their vessels, thus reducing the number of fishing trips they have to make and 
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decreasing their exposure to risk at sea, by building higher and wider. Because 
length restrictions prevent them from building longer as well, these modifications 
often result in decreased stability: "I seen thirty last year, dozens of boats not 
fit to be on a lake, let alone the ocean. The style, shape of boats" (FH 07). 
In particular, these regulations cause harvesters to build their vessels "too high 
-too much boat out of the water, not enough in the water" (FH 16). One 
respondent remarked that the size and shape of a vessel is "important like a 
car- [that it's] the right width, stable" (FH 42). Others argued specifically 
against government's capacity-based rationale for length restrictions, saying 
DFO should "alleviate regulations on boat size but not quota increases- we 
feel unsafe, don't need more quota. Crab boats are forced offshore in 
34'11 "s but they should be in a 45' or 50' boat. That takes years to change 
and shouldn't be out there in those boats but he got to make do with what 
he got" (FH 39). Another said harvesters should "be allowed a boat that's 
safe to fish in" (FH 40). Overall, most of the harvesters we interviewed felt that 
their input should be combined with that of external actors to prevent over-
regulation, and to ensure that the regulations are practical. Many shared this 
man's suggestion for some kind of co-management system: "Fish harvesters 
should have input before regulations are put in place- they're the ones 
that have to do it" (FH 39). 
Almost every harvester we interviewed felt that the regulation of the 
industry is somehow disconnected from their day-to-day experience of it: "The 
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way the fishery is regulated, we're struggling now with rules. If we could 
fish like we could 20 years ago we'd do better. No fish to handle now 
because we're not allowed to catch it, not because it's not there" (FH 40). 
The concept of job satisfaction provides a useful lens through which we can 
focus on harvesters' perceptions of various aspects of their work. 
Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is a useful gauge to measure how harvesters feel about their 
work. As Figure 8 illustrates, overall satisfaction with "fishing as a job" is high, 
with an overall satisfaction level of 4.3 out of 5. Certain items scored consistently 
high among harvesters; for example, "the people you work with" scored 4.8, with 
everyone answering either "satisfied" or "very satisfied." Conversely - but as we 
might expect from the quotes above - the average satisfaction with "government 
regulations" was only 1.8. It was the only item out of 20 in which no one said 
they were "very satisfied." Other high-ranking factors include "working outdoors" 
(mean= 4.8), "being out on the water'' (mean= 4.7), and "the opportunity to be 
your own boss" (mean= 4.4). 
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Figure 8: Participants' satisfaction with fishing as a job 
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High-ranking factors appear to cluster around traditional aspects of fishing work, 
such as being on the water and outdoors, and the people they work with. 
On the other hand, lower ranking items appear to cluster around new 
initiatives in the fisheries; that is, regulations, professionalization, and 'job 
security'. Some harvesters expressed nostalgia for the days when they could 
choose their times to fish more freely, and felt more like their own bosses. Now 
they feel as though they are told when to go out and when to come back, and the 
corresponding lack of freedom and control decreases their satisfaction with their 
work: "so many rules for what you can and can't do, it's not worth it 
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anymore" (FH 32). One harvester summed up his conflicting feelings: "lots of 
changes. [It's) torture now- it's in my blood though" (FH 46). 
Fishing and Family 
As a way of inquiring about the social relations surrounding risky work, we 
asked "would your family rather see you in a different occupation?" The answers 
were almost evenly divided: 49 percent of harvesters said yes, while 51 percent 
said no. Seventy-eight percent of harvesters would go fishing again if they had 
their lives to live over One fisherman pointed out why it may be difficult for family 
to have a loved one working out at sea: "[I've] provided well at an awful cost: 
peace of mind" (FH 18). Overall, however, risks and hardship are commonly 
accepted as part of the fishing way of life. In response to our question, "how 
satisfied are you with the feeling that you're doing something worthwhile?" a 
harvester said that he'd "never had a job that made me feel so proud" (FH 
17). Comments like this paint a clear picture of why such a dangerous job pulls 
workers back out to sea to perform the work that, in many cases, their fathers 
and grandfathers did. 
We asked if they would, or do, encourage their children to go fishing. Only 
13 percent (n = 6) would encourage their children to fish. Replies ranged from 
"Jesus no!" (FH 08) to "not with fishing going like it is, trying to keep them 
83 
out of it" (FH 23) to "yes, my son is 235 miles south of St. John's on a 
swordfish boat as we speak" (FH 22). 
"They never hurts like we do": Who Defines Risk? 
The cultural approach to fishing safety pays careful attention to how risks 
are defined, and by whom, as well as who bears responsibility for reducing 
these risks. In order to discover what risks- and consequences- are 
accepted by fish harvesters, we asked "What kinds of injuries are 
considered to be 'normal' or just part of the job?" Back problems or 
injuries were mentioned by 20 respondents, or 43 percent, and slips, falls, 
cuts and bruises were mentioned frequently as well. One harvester said 
that expected injuries include "cuts, [but] you don't have to be careless 
for them" (FH 44). This indicates the unpredictable nature of a job on a 
moving platform, and is an argument against the notion that human error, 
or incompetence, or lack of due diligence, is the primary cause of most 
injuries onboard . 
. We also asked "In your opinion, have you experienced any health 
problems that are related to fishing?" Twelve (26%) said that they had 
experienced some trouble with their back, and one said "arthritis - all the 
fishermen my age" (FH 33). Four mentioned sore arms or carpal tunnel 
syndrome, and 52 percent (n = 24) said they had not experienced any health 
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problems related to fishing. One harvester replied "Yes, any physical job 
would have it (back, shoulders, knees, elbows) but not an office job" (FH 
28). Another agreed: "No ... aches but any type of manual job would have 
that. Numb feet and legs and feet burn, I think that's old age." (FH 32). 
Although they interpreted the direction of the question a little differently, the 
answers are similar in spirit. These harvesters recognize that any form of 
manual work can be hard on the body, and fishing can lead to injury even when 
workers are very careful. 
The cultural perspective highlights the socially-constructed nature of the 
debates happening about safety at sea, and can help us to identify factors that 
have been neglected up until now by the dominant paradigm. One clear-cut 
example of this cultural dimension of risk is tension over the direct and indirect 
costs of quotas, mandatory equipment and training. As Henry, an older male fish 
harvester, pointed out, "the problem with having safety gear- we'd like to 
have it but the way they got us cut back in the fishery we're struggling to 
get by" (FH 40). He forcefully reiterated this point at the end of his interview: 
We fished all our lives and enjoy fishing, invested everything 
we got our whole lives and could lose it all. There's fish -
making us starve and let big boats go. They never hurts like 
we do. If fish are inshore why not let us fish it? I knows more 
about our job than those at a desk. We're getting the same 
amount of fish in six nets or 12 nets as we used to with 110 
nets, so there's lots of fish. Put nets down for one and a half 
hours, 12 nets, near Labrador and got over 30001bs - not that 
there's no fish- they just won't let us fish. Are they trying to 
get us out of Newfoundland? The big boats, factory freezer, 
their fish is leaving the country. The policy makers thinks 
fishermen haven't got a clue. Big problem with safety - if you 
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come to my boat you'll see equipment that I'm missing but I 
can only barely afford to get by. I'd like to have it but the 
bottom line is I can't have it (FH 40). 
The next section presents the CVs of our three groups of harvesters, in 
order to breathe life into the comments and figures above. 
Imaginary Curricula Vitae 
In order to present a snapshot of the different groups of harvesters who took part 
in this study, I decided to use Wendy Rickard's imaginary CV format. The 
categories covered include the participants' names (not their real names); age; 
qualifications; previous employment; current job; accident and injury history; and 
their thoughts on safety. All three of the names on the vitae are pseudonyms. 
The comments and results largely suggested three broad cohorts, and I 
have selected illustrative cases for each. To this end, I include one older male 
harvester (Figure 9), one younger male harvester (Figure 1 0), and a female 
harvester (Figure 11 ). The male harvesters I present are composites created 
from information from members of each group who were participants in our 
study, with only identifying details changed to protect privacy. Although both 
men and women were invited to participate in this we received very little 
response from women: only one participated. We did not have enough female 
participants to accurately create a composite character from our respondents. 
However, I felt it would be remiss to present only men as "typical" harvesters, 
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given women's increasing entry into and work in the fisheries. I therefore created 
a female harvester character by drawing on information from our female 
participant as well as from accounts of women fish harvesters in Brenda Grzetic's 
book, Women Fishes These Days. 
The two composite male harvester categories were assembled based on 
differences in their comments about training and experience that appear to be 
related to their age, and the stage of their career in which professionalization was 
introduced. The three levels of certification include Apprentice, Levell and Level 
II; harvesters advance from one level to the next based on their completion of a 
set number of years of full-time fishing, as well as the completion of a specific 
number of land-based credits. Some mature harvesters had been 
"grandfathered in," or assigned a level of certification when Professionalization 
began, based on their historic attachment to the fisheries and their financial 
dependence on the industry. This might mean that they were not required to do 
the same courses as younger harvesters would have been, and they often 
expressed some negativity about the requirements for training. For example, 
one said Professionalization "didn't mean nothing" (FH 15) and another 
referred to it as "garbage ... educating is not always smart" (FH 18). They feel 
"now it's too advanced -schooling and training isn't what we're there for" 
(FH 24) and "at my age, few of us went through high school, it's 
overwhelming" (32). 
87 






Current position: Owner-operator ("skipper") 
EDUCATION/QUALIFICATIONS 
Left school in Grade 7 to fish 
Lifeline safety course (offered after the Moratorium) 
Basic Safety Training 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT 
Fishing in small boat for lobster 
Deckhand on 34' 11" 
"I never got a land-based paycheque" (FH 40}. 
CURRENT JOB 
Level II Fish Harvester 
Owner-operator of 44'11" vessel 
ACCIDENT & INJURY HISTORY 
Some close calls- almost collided with another vessel 
Fell overboard once; not injured 
Fell through the hatch; broke two ribs 
THOUGHTS ON SAFETY 
"The problem with having safety gear - we'd like to have it but the 
way they got us cut back in the fishery we're struggling to get by" 
(from FH040). 
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Current position: Deckhand, gunner 
EDUCATION/QUALIFICATIONS 
Grade 12 graduation 
MED A1 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT 
Worked in Alberta in construction 
CURRENT JOB 
Level I Fish Harvester 
Deckhand onboard 64'11 "; gunner onboard 34'11" for sealing 
5 years experience 
ACCIDENT & INJURY HISTORY 
Some bruises and strained muscles 
Fell off the boat onto the ice while sealing 
THOUGHTS ON SAFETY 
"With sealing equipment, you're in God's pocket" (FH 17). 
"Some skippers have no training; they might not realize they're 
putting life in harm's way all the time" (FH 17}. 
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Current position: Deckhand 
EDUCATION/QUAL! FICATIONS 




Fish processing worker 
CURRENT JOB 
Level II Fish Harvester 
Works with husband aboard 34'11 " 
12 years experience 
ACCIDENT & INJURY HISTORY 
Cuts on hands 
Slipped getting out of boat (hurt arm) 
THOUGHTS ON SAFETY 
"I worry about the weather during the open and close of the 
fisheries" (FH 24). 
"I think there should be more women fisherpersons because I 
believe women are more aware of safety than men. They are more 
conscious of things like wearing your life jacket" (pp 83). 
"I can swim but my husband can't. I mean, what would happen if 
he fell over? What would I do? I could throw him a life buoy but 
that's it. How do I get him back in the boat?" (pp 75). 
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The results suggest that fish harvesters' perceptions of risk sometimes 
differ from other stakeholders' perceptions. The relevance of this for the different 
approaches to understanding risk in the literature is that the harvesters' 
experiential knowledge can highlight processes, events and circumstances that 
have been previously neglected in the study of risk. In addition to this, 
harvesters can share important insights on how risk factors interact. Chapter 
Five discusses the data presented here and proposes explanations as to why the 
patterns and diversities occur. 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
Fish harvesters' perceptions of risk are mediated by their experience, 
which includes: what they learn from others, and see and do when setting up or 
changing their enterprise; recruiting and training their crew; deciding when and 
where to sail; as well as their experience on the deck and in the wheelhouse of 
the boat while at sea, and on land when responding to government requests and 
regulatory regimes. Harvesters are out at sea at the point of interaction of 
cascading effects (physical, human capital, structural and cultural} and can 
provide very important insights into interactivity and commercial fishing safety. 
Many legislators and managers whose decisions are directly or indirectly 
affecting safety have never set foot on a fishing vessel and harvesters recognize 
and often resent this fact. One of the primary goals of this study was to make the 
implicit elements of the harvesters' experience, safety decisions and concerns 
explicit for the purpose of making these elements more accessible to external 
experts responsible for regulation and enforcement. 
This chapter begins by exploring some of the diversity among harvesters. 
Next I examine the effects of biophysical, human capital , structural and cultural 
factors on fishing safety when seen through the eyes of these harvesters. The 
sections on human capital and structural factors (external actors) are discussed 
at greater length than the others, reflecting the proportion of statements made by 
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the harvesters interviewed for this study. After examining the effects of the 
factors individually, I apply the integrated framework developed in Chapter Two 
to illustrate how they can be described as having interactive, cascading effects. 
To do this, we will look at specific incidents mentioned by harvesters and 
examine how structural and human capital factors, for example, interacted in 
ways that magnified or reduced risk. The concluding chapter will summarize the 
major findings, as well as identify what we did not learn, and how future research 
could help fill these gaps. 
Diversity 
Before moving on to a discussion of themes that emerged from the interviews 
and interactive effects, it is important to see where the diversity lies among fish 
harvesters. There are temporal differences in the observations and experience of 
these harvesters related to age and the seasons they fish, as well as spatial 
differences (where fishing grounds are, what size of vessel, where they work on 
deck) in their fisheries. These spatial and temporal dimensions of fisheries 
interact with the cultural, organizational and regulatory dimensions to influence 
risk and perceptions of risk. All dimensions are dynamic in that they change over 
time as they interact. 
Variables such as age, experience, and the type of vessel worked on, may 
affect harvesters' views of safety and risk. Crew on large ships, for example, 
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were less likely to rate weather (and forecasting) as important safety factors than 
skippers and crew on smaller vessels. For a harvester on a small vessel making 
daily decisions about whether to go fishing or stay in port, weather forecasting is 
very important. One such harvester remarked of meteorologists: "they're not 
out on the water. It changes everything for us, everything." Crews on larger 
ships, other than a few officers, have less say regarding whether to set sail than 
the owner-operators of smaller vessels, and large ships are more likely to set sail 
regardless of weather conditions. 
Diversity of experience and opinion also exist between younger and older 
fish harvesters. Many of the older harvesters entered the industry at a time when 
no formal fishing or safety training was required. They tend to resent mandatory 
training more than younger harvesters, often feeling it is an external burden 
placed on them, when, by virtue of their decades of work in the fisheries and the 
fact that they remain able to work, they feel they do not particularly need it (i.e., 
the 'unsafe' workers have already removed themselves by having a major 
accident). In contrast, younger harvesters tend to expect mandatory training; they 
are entering the industry knowing that formal education is part of the career of a 
modern fish harvester. 
From the data we have, it is hard to assess the relationship between 
safety training and perceptions of risk. Statistical correlations on this data are not 
really possible, because the harvesters' responses to questions on which 
courses they had completed are messy. Only one harvester said he was "not 
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sure" whether or not he had completed Basic Safety Training (FH 15) and thus 
potentially had not completed any safety-specific training at all. Many harvesters 
said they had completed "one or the other" of the courses, or they thought they 
had done a course but were not sure, or could not remember the name of it. 
Therefore, there are no clear divisions among the large group of harvesters (45) 
who have completed one or more courses in terms of which or how many 
courses they had done. In future research, it might be of benefit to ask them to 
look up which courses they had done (perhaps by gathering their certificates of 
completion prior to the research) , or to ask PFHCB for a list of harvesters who 
had completed certain courses, but the data in its current form is difficult to work 
with. Thus, the information presented on training and its relevance is largely 
gathered from specific comments made by harvesters about the usefulness of 
training rather than quantitative calculations. 
Having said that, the relationship between safety training and perceptions 
of the importance of training seems to suggest a sort of spiral in that once a 
harvester is trained, they see the value in what they did. They may feel it was 
useful to practice with safety and survival equipment like life rafts and immersion 
suits. Prior to or without the training, they may perceive it as a burden to be 
endured, "too much trouble" or as potentially embarrassing. This negative 
perception may be especially strong if they do not know how to swim or read; 
older harvesters may worry that they will not be able to complete some of the 
exercises required to pass the training courses. 
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Some harvesters we interviewed spoke to the frustration created by 
increasing requirements for formal education in an industry whose workers 
traditionally had little formal schooling: "now it's too advanced - schooling 
and training isn't what we're there for" (FH 24) and "at my age, few of us 
went through high school, it's overwhelming" (FH 32). Younger harvesters 
are less likely to find this a challenge. Newfoundland and Labrador law now 
states that individuals may not leave school until the age of 16. Because it is 
now common knowledge that professionalization is a mandatory part of the 
modern fisheries, younger fishers have an increased incentive to stay in school 
and to learn to read and write. Older harvesters may have started fishing as 
early as the age of nine (FH 08), and three of the harvesters we interviewed have 
an education level of Grade Six or less (FH 03, FH 26, and FH 42); these factors 
may increase the likelihood of difficulties with literacy and thus formal safety 
training. 
Biophysical Environment 
Biophysical factors include the sex of the harvesters, species fished and the 
related location and nature of the grounds, the weather, water temperature and 
vessel design. Such biophysical factors as poor weather and the risks (such as 
rocky shoals) that are associated with particular fishing grounds have always 
been part of fishing and play a major role in the perception of fishing as a risky 
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occupation. Of the 23 accidents that occurred, only four happened in inclement 
weather (two in high winds and two in snow). While important, poor weather 
appears to be less of a risk factor in and of itself than a variable that makes 
harvesters more vigilant to the possibility of an incident. Thus, for the harvesters 
we interviewed, most incidents tended to happen during the day in good weather 
when safety may not have been the first thought on their minds, as opposed to 
during "dark and stormy nights". This seems counter-intuitive, but may relate to 
the fact that we did not hear about any serious incidents such as a vessel 
capsizing or the death of a crew member. If we had inquired about the period 
prior to the last ten years, we might have found that very poor weather is 
correlated with severe accidents, but not mild to moderately bad ones. 
Alternatively, this finding may be due to the small sample size in this study. 
Weather interacts with other biophysical and social factors to mediate risk. 
For instance, almost 40 percent of the harvesters I interviewed fish from vessels 
in the 24' to 34'11" length category. When the weather is good (often called 
"fine" or "fair" by harvesters) all boats in this sector in their area can leave at the 
same time; when the weather is very poor, no vessels can set out. However, 
moderately bad weather can pose a serious problem for this sector: high winds 
that permit the larger vessels to set out can present significant danger to middle-
and small-sized vessels. If the larger ships set their gear and take a good first 
haul, the smaller vessels are apt to go despite the weather, especially in a fishery 
that has a competitive quota. Even if there are Individual Quotas, the 
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Department of Fisheries and Oceans can close the season at any time if they 
feel it is appropriate or necessary, which means those who do not catch their 
quotas quickly might lose out. Alternatively, in fisheries where the quality and 
therefore price of the catch can decrease as the season progresses (as with soft-
shell crab, for example), it is an urgent priority to get out and set traps as quickly 
as possible. Thus, a variety of social and regulatory factors can mediate the 
effect of weather on risk. 
Human Capital Approach 
The human capital approach to risk focuses on factors such as an individual's 
level of training, experience, attitudes (including coping mechanisms) and their 
perceptions of risk. 
Our results somewhat disagree with those of researchers who see human 
capital factors such as coping mechanisms (Murray and Dolomount 1994) and 
accident proneness (Iverson and Erwin 1997) as the main contributors to risk and 
danger at sea. In terms of coping mechanisms, only one harvester we 
interviewed said fishing is 'less dangerous than most other jobs', suggesting that 
trivialization of risk is not as widespread in this sample as expected or found in 
other studies. This harvester said he sees fishing as having "the same [risk as 
other jobs] or even less. I don't play that up" (FH 41 ). He did fit with the 
predicted pattern of those who tend to trivialize risk in that he had been fishing 
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many years and fished with his two children (Murray & Dolomount 1994). 
Whether saying fishing is risky is 'playing it up' or whether it is acknowledging the 
fact that he works in a statistically dangerous occupation could be considered a 
matter of debate. Overall, however, harvesters interviewed for this study 
appeared to openly acknowledge the high level of risk associated with fishing as 
a job. Gaba and Viscusi argue that those with less education are less likely to 
consider a particular job risky (1998). While this harvester did not graduate high 
school, he did complete some courses at the high school level and went on to 
obtain a Fishing Master 4 designation. 
Some have argued that high rates of accidents and injuries are largely due 
not to dangerous work environments, but rather to specific workers who incur 
repeated injuries. Iverson and Irwin's theory would suggest that high rates of 
accidents are not due to many accidents spread out over the worker population, 
but rather to a few workers who have many accidents (1997). Thus, from this 
perspective, the appropriate way to reduce the number of accidents is to target 
accident-prone individuals. Our results do not support this hypothesis, because 
half of the harvesters we interviewed had been involved in an accident in the past 
ten years. In terms of the accident-prone hypothesis, the statistics for "falling 
overboard" could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis because one sealer 
fell overboard twelve times in the last 1 0 years. However, I argue this is more 
closely related to the fishery involved, or the tasks (and thus physical location on 
the vessel) rather than one individual being more "prone" than another. For 
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example, a gunner on a sealing vessel is more "prone" to fall overboard than a 
skipper in the wheelhouse. (Only one of the harvesters who had targeted seal in 
2004 identified himself as a gunner.) The "accident proneness" hypothesis may 
also relate to the nature and setting of the work; falling overboard is not 
something that would be possible in a factory or office, for example, so traditional 
occupational health and safety research might focus on things like cuts and slips. 
Another human capital factor other researchers have linked to risk is the 
skill, training and experience of the members onboard, particularly the captain. 
The theme "Having a good skipper'' in our responses points to the realization 
among harvesters that human decisions play a large part in determining levels of 
risk and the outcome of a risky situation. Human behavior does not fully 
determine the parameters of risk, but it certainly plays an important role. The 
issue of greenhorns (inexperienced crew) alluded to by a few harvesters points to 
this as well; however, every harvester has to begin fishing sometime, and if new 
crew are properly supervised this does not present a problem (FH 20, FH 25, FH 
29). Multiple greenhorns on one vessel may require more help and supervision 
than experienced crew can offer. 
Our findings on "all depends on who the skipper of the boat is" support 
Nordic research by Palsson (1994), whose respondents said that the "Captain's 
disposition" was one of the most important factors related to the enskilment of 
fish harvesters. Palsson argues that the role of captains has changed with 
regulatory and other changes in the Icelandic fishery. They have gone from being 
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colloquially called 'catch-kings' to 'quota-kings' with increased regulation taking 
the individual skill and "nose for fishing" out of consideration. With increased and 
increasingly stringent management policies, being a "good" captain may become 
more a matter of how much quota one can access or accumulate. 
While Palsson is not writing about safety specifically, his work has 
implications for understanding job satisfaction and processes related to the 
acquisition of safety and other skills at sea in this study. The job satisfaction 
questions where responses ranked highest all related to autonomy and included 
such phrases as 'the opportunity to be your own boss' and 'a sense of 
adventure.' Many harvesters remarked that their satisfaction with these aspects 
of their job is not as high as it used to be when they first started fishing. As such, 
it is plain that what might be considered 'pure' human capital factors (satisfaction, 
and feelings of control and autonomy, for example) are shaped to a large extent 
by such structural factors as regulatory change. High levels of stress and 
dissatisfaction with changes in the work environment might make it difficult to pay 
attention to tasks at hand, which might in turn increase the likelihood of having an 
accident. 
Structure 
Government regulations are a huge issue for the sample of harvesters 
interviewed here and elicited the most comments. When asked, "in your opinion, 
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what are the three things that have the most effect on fishing safety?" one 
participant replied "regulations, regulations, and regulations" (FH 18). This 
harvester later changed one of the items to 'weather forecasting', but the force of 
the original answer speaks to the importance assigned to policy by harvesters. 
This is likely because regulatory agencies, particularly the people in positions of 
authority within those agencies, have the power to change their fishing lives and 
experiences, including the parameters of occupational risk (Jermier, Gaines & 
Macintosh 1989). The government regulators tend to individualize and approach 
fishing safety using a human capital paradigm, while fish harvesters focus on the 
impact of regulations on safety. They focus on how, structurally, they are being 
put in harm's way. 
Some harvesters, particularly those who have 'grown up fishing' by first 
helping family members and eventually moving into their own boat, reported a 
strong sense of uncontrolled change in particular fisheries. They seemed to feel 
that some of the conservation rules and regulations painted them as ignorant and 
eager to 'fish out' the stocks. For some, these regulations are even more 
important for fishing safety than safety regulations. It is not possible to say for 
how many, as there is no specific question in the data to access this, but the 
feel ing was certainly communicated through harvesters' tone of voice when 
discussing policies. 
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Intended Safety Consequences of Regulations 
One of the issues with rigid regulations applied evenly across diverse fisheries 
occurring in dynamic environments is whether it is possible to generalize across 
space and time. Rules are by nature generalizable, but they may not be 
appropriate in all situations or for all relevant risks; rules may make some risks 
worse or create new ones in some contexts. Thus, regulations can actually put 
people at risk, which can present a serious problem when they are designed by 
authorities with no legislative responsibility for safety. 
Important implications for injury prevention stem from the conflicting 
pressures harvesters confront to make a living and to put safety first. On the one 
hand, fish harvesters certainly recognize the need for safety equipment and 
training and to minimize the risk of injury by monitoring when, where and how 
they fish, as well as who they fish with. On the other hand, they are quick to 
point out the financial pressures placed on them by a combination of safety 
regulations, high costs and limited incomes. 
In terms of safety training requirements, some fish harvesters who have 
done the training seem to be more conscious of certain issues like vessel 
stability, but those who have not yet done the mandatory training feel that it is 
prohibitively expensive and distant from their location. We did not specifically 
ask a question that addressed this, but it came up in the focus groups and was 
mentioned as an aside in a few interviews. This can pose a problem to those 
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who fish with their spouse; they must both do the training, which can be a 
concern for families with small children. 
Regulations that deal with mandatory inspections and survival equipment 
also have intended safety consequences. The last chapter revealed that the 
percentage of harvesters who have safety equipment onboard is rarely as high 
as the percentage of harvesters who claim to know how to use such equipment. 
This may reflect how we asked the question about the vessel they spent most of 
their time on; harvesters might have fished on several vessels in their career and 
practiced using safety equipment that is not on their primary vessel. However, as 
Douglas points out, there can be controversy over the costs of safe production 
(1986) and therefore tension over mandatory equipment and training costs. 
Some harvesters feel that having a life-ring aboard a boat when there is only one 
person fishing is senseless; "what is the use of a life ring if there's no one 
there to throw it to you?" (FH 15). However, one rationale for this rule is that 
harvesters fishing alone, but in close proximity to each other, would be able to 
throw a life-ring to someone else who needs help. This illustrates the need for 
clear communication on the part of regulators and safety trainers, so that 
harvesters understand the need for each piece of required safety equipment, and 
why it is not 'nonsense' or a waste of money. 
One possible solution to the documented resentment and resistance 
harvesters have for regulations might be for the government to offer some sort of 
financial incentive for training and safety equipment. This would have the benefit 
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of supporting a trained, skilled, well-equipped (and hopefully safe) workforce 
while reducing the conflict and risk created by the cost-price squeeze. 
Some rules that are meant to increase safety are undermined, or 
mitigated, by other factors such as prices or competitive fisheries. Fisheries with 
Individual Quotas, for example, which are usually seen as enhancing safety, can 
be impacted by other variables which can augment risk. For example, one 
harvester points to the danger of "overloading the boat, especially when 
you're on quota and have far to go- don't want to make an extra trip" (FH 
33). Likewise, better boats or better forecasts may have the potential to 
increase safety, but this potential benefit can be counteracted by a competitive 
fishery in which people feel forced to go. 
Unintended Safety Consequences of Regulations 
Conservation rules and regulations seem to exert the strongest forces 
undermining safety, according to the harvesters I interviewed. Vessel 
replacement and/or modification rules are seen as having a big effect on safety, 
particularly as fishing vessels moved further offshore in the 1990s. The size of 
vessels seems to present a problem as the medium-sized vessels are trying to 
keep up with the big boats and stay ahead of the smaller boats. Harvesters 
insisted that vessel replacement rules have a huge impact on safety, although 
government regulators argue that the rules are in place for conservation and 
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capacity reasons. There is some controversy over this idea, but the debate is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Other than vessel length, season length was the next most mentioned 
area of regulation with unintended safety consequences. More flexibility is called 
for by harvesters because weather can severely impact who can safely go to 
sea, or perhaps more importantly, who will try to go and when the seasons are 
short or are about to close harvesters might be more likely to take a chance on 
fishing in bad weather. Similarly, gear-setting rules affect fleets differently: large 
ships appear to suffer little safety impact; medium vessels experience major 
impact; and small vessels experience major impact. One harvester remarked , 
"when you're carrying gear in or out, you want to make sure you have 
stable seas" (FH 11 ). Gear-setting rules specify that lobster pots can only be 
set in a certain 48-hour time frame (increased from 24 hours due to similar safety 
issues in the past). This means that the boat, typically sized for checking the 
pots and bringing back the catch, is often overloaded to get the first set of pots 
out as close to the opening of the season as possible. Several harvesters 
mentioned the fact that the "first catch is always the best," so to delay setting 
pots because of the weather is often not seen as an option. Likewise, at the end 
of the season pots have to come in during a very specific timeframe or 
harvesters face hefty fines. They feel they are sometimes forced to go out in 
unfit weather or else be punished by law. 
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Safety Consequences of Too Little Regulation 
We did not have a question that specifically asked whether certain fisheries in the 
province are too tightly regulated, but many harvesters offered that opinion as an 
aside to their answers to related questions on related topics; for example, "it's 
too much" (FH 29) and "overregulated" (FH 17). The sealing industry is the 
only exception: licensing requires no formal training of commercial sealers, 
simply a two-year span working with a professional sealer. They are 
encouraged, but not required, to take courses on hunting techniques and product 
preparation (DFO 2007), but it is possible to have relative novices on the ice 
shooting high-powered rifles. I spoke to a gunner who loved the adventure of 
the hunt, but who has fallen off the vessel several times. One harvester (FH 15) 
noted the danger of stepping on ice that appears solid, but is in fact "slub" ice. 
He emphasized the importance of testing one's path with a gaff stick. In addition 
to these risks, there is the chance of being shot by another sealer. The 
conditions on the ice are often stormy, and several sealers noted that being 
among the seals is not the safest place to be. Two sealers specifically 
suggested a boat quota is needed to reduce the dangers posed by an open, 
competitive seal hunt (FH 17 and FH 18). There is also the danger of getting 
stuck in the ice; the National Fisherman (August 2007) reported that some 
vessels were immobilized by ice for over 21 days in the 2007 hunt! 
Overall, more input in the policy-making process is desired by fish 
harvesters as a way to positively impact safety in the fisheries. Official statistics 
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are often used to justify policies and regulations that impact safety; however, our 
research reveals that many accidents and injuries are not reported to emergency 
response organizations. According to our interviewees, none of the 23 accidents 
we heard about had been reported to Search and Rescue or Coast Guard, and 
only six to the WHSCC. If an injury or accident does not require Coast Guard or 
Search and Rescue to be called in, and does not result in a WHSCC claim, then 
it slips under the radar. It is difficult for regulatory agencies to prevent injuries of 
which they are not aware. Isolated anecdotes are not enough to base policy on, 
so it seems important to find some way of encouraging harvesters to 
systematically share their observations on near-misses and other types of 
accidents that are not reported . This will permit policy to be more sensitive to 
methods of preventing accidents and injuries that are currently underreported 
and therefore overlooked. 
The perceived legitimacy (and motives) of the people and groups 
implementing policies that affect safety can dramatically alter the extent to which 
the policies are accepted as valid; for example, one harvester suggested "they 
never hurts like we do .... the policy makers thinks fishermen haven't got a 
clue" (FH 40). The best safety policy possible might be of limited value if 
introduced by an agency which is distrusted by fishermen. The ideal method 
would be to have safety experts working alongside fishermen, with not just one-
shot inspections saying "you don't have this or this", but rather a feedback spiral 
so that harvesters feel like their input is valuable and taken seriously. 
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Cultural Approach 
From the cultural perspective, one of the key issues is who has the power to 
shape and define risks. Fish harvesters have a keen sense that not everyone 
has an equal role in shaping and defining risks and this feeling of disparity is 
reflected in their comments. For example, one harvester wondered why the 'big 
boats' are allowed to fish cod while the fleet of smaller vessels is not (FH 40). 
Central to the understanding of cultural factors in fishing risk is the question of 
who has power to define risk and to define the policy response to risk. For 
instance, some harvesters argue that because of government regulations they 
have to buy dilapidated old boats rather than purchase or build new, safer 
vessels. DFO regulators are trying to reduce overall fleet capacity through the 
Vessel Replacement Policy (DFO 2002), although fish harvesters argue that they 
do not want more fishing capacity, and that just because they have a bigger boat 
does not mean they have to fill it every time they come ashore. They indicate 
that having a larger vessel could mean that they could make fewer trips, bringing 
in more of the catch on each trip and spending less time exposed to risks at sea. 
This example shows how looking at the same issue through different lenses (for 
example, conservation and safety) can highlight the differing priorities of different 
groups. 
The cultural perspective can be compared to the metaphor Messing 
(1998) uses to describe a theory of social determinism ("clay pegs in round or 
square holes"). She says that a cultural view of work would argue stereotyping 
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and other social forces tend to push or pull men and women into different types 
of jobs and that in different times and places, these forces may differ. In contrast, 
a structural approach would consider the differences between men and women 
and their typical jobs to be more fixed. To extrapolate from this metaphor to 
fishing safety, the tensions over the costs of safe production (Douglas 1986) exist 
because social forces, and not natural divisions of responsibilities, dictate how 
some groups can exert influence on decision-makers more directly than others. 
This may partially explain why safety equipment seems prohibitively expensive 
(the influence of equipment manufacturers and market forces) , and why safety 
training is seen as somewhat inaccessible (costs are decided on by the groups 
offering the courses). To relate this back to Messing (1998), we could say that 
social forces play a greater role in determining the costs of safe production than 
a structural perspective might have us believe. 
Protective Factors 
There are a number of factors harvesters mentioned that can help to reduce risk 
at sea. While regulations drew a great deal of negative attention in terms of 
safety, regulations regarding training and safety equipment were largely viewed 
in a positive light. Mandatory training is seen as a good thing overall; "fishing is 
dangerous, but if you're trained it's not as dangerous as it could be" (FH 
25). Training in stability is useful , for example, providing it is introduced in ways 
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that resonate with harvesters. Policies on mandatory safety equipment are seen 
as being important as well. It is seen as beneficial that harvesters have to bring 
appropriate safety and survival equipment with them, but financial constraints 
prevent people from carrying everything they are legislated to carry, or would like 
to carry) (FH 40). A few harvesters suggested that more input by practicing fish 
harvesters could help to identify and alleviate some of the safety constraints 
caused by policy: "fish harvesters should have input before regulations are 
put in place- they're the ones that have to do it." (FH 39) 
Another protective factor that harvesters mentioned is the use of 
redundant safety and survival systems and equipment onboard a fishing vessel. 
This may include supplementing modern methods or technologies with traditional 
ones; for example, learning celestial navigation to supplement technological 
systems or learning how to forecast weather with change of clouds (FH 42}. 
Such redundancy may also take the shape of physical backup equipment, 
including carrying extra compasses (FH 17, FH 25, FH 28) and marine batteries 
(FH 42). Furthermore, there can and should be multiple crewmembers who are 
trained in essential skills onboard; for example, it could be very important to 
having more than one person who is trained to navigate the boat home if 
anything goes wrong. 
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Applying the Integrated Framework 
Ideally, we need a way to deal with injury prevention in a dynamic 
environment. Messing's (1998) notion of clay pegs in clay holes is an effective 
way of understanding this type of dynamism and its relationship to occupational 
health in that it considers mutual adaptations of worker and work environment 
(24). Rather than viewing harvesters as static individuals, we need to consider 
the dynamism of human capital factors: people are learning all the time, from 
both formal training and personal experience. Likewise, structural aspects of 
fishing safety, including both intended and unintended consequences of various 
policies, change from season to season and interact with human capital factors. 
Messing's work has the potential to address such risk factors in ways that fit 
them together like pieces of a puzzle, instead of simply naming single factors in 
isolation. This would be one of the main benefits of using an integrated approach 
to fishing safety. 
Tomer's (1999) method of repeat visits to fish harvesters' vessels by 
safety experts could work quite well in this way. Rather than focusing only on 
what harvesters are required to have onboard (although that would be one 
purpose), such visits could open up a dialogue about fishing safely, and ideas for 
improving practices and routines onboard. Such repeat visits to harvesters who 
participate would open up an avenue for tracking change and anticipating what 
kinds of changes in safety might occur when changes in biophysical or structural 
factors occur. 
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Because of this, I support Neis and Kean (2003) in the call for fish 
harvesters' knowledge to be combined with that of DFO scientists and would 
apply it to safety, with harvester knowledge as well as that of safety experts and 
policymakers contributing to an integrated understanding. Fishing safety is a 
workplace issue and should incorporate ergonomics and 'fishing safely' 
everyday, not simply emergency protocol , and should account for both behavioral 
and non-behavioral factors. When several problems (or risk factors) arise at 
once - engine failure and poor weather, for example - an emergency can 
escalate devastatingly fast. 
The next section presents selected quotations from the f ish harvesters I 
interviewed with a focus on how the interactivity of risk factors can compound 
danger. 
Cascading Effects 
Harvesters described how the combination of risk factors makes situations 
exponentially more dangerous than in situations where each risk factor is 
operating in isolation. For example, a small boat may be perfectly safe in good 
weather; however, if policies such as a competitive fishery combine with the 
effects of vessel replacement rules and poor weather, the risk to harvesters can 
be very high. 
The first quote is from a harvester who was "down in 3Ps with engine 
out, electrical failure and in fog with shipping and large vessels" (FH 41 ). 
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This brief quote illustrates the interaction of biophysical factors (fog), human 
capital factors (whether crew members were experienced with this kind of 
situation, or trained or knowledgeable about navigation, shipping lanes, and 
proper signaling), and structural factors (vessel design, maintenance and 
inspections, whether legislated to carry spare parts, availability of Search and 
Rescue resources). Such interaction between risk factors suggests that 
complementary and redundant systems might be the most effective way to 
prevent accidents at sea. As Binkley mentions, traditional methods of forecasting 
and navigating should complement new technologies (1995) rather than be 
superseded by them. The factors can be said to 'cascade' because each 
influences the others: fishing in 3Ps might be perfectly safe in good weather, for 
example, but fishing in fog with engine and electrical failure might create or 
compound distress, particularly while in a high-traffic shipping lane. The idea of 
experience might not be solely a human capital factor, as the fishing grounds 
"down in 3Ps" might be new to them because of the structural changes taking 
place in the industry. 
A second quote to illustrate cascading effects is by a harvester who 
describes: "taking on water after lending out lifejackets- left the wharf, 
didn't check for lifejackets and life raft, I think" (FH 44). In this situation, 
something that might normally be a habit at a friendly wharf - lending out 
lifejackets- quickly turns troublesome when an adverse event occurs. The pre-
trip safety practice of ensuring that all safety equipment is present was not 
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followed; whether it was a one-time event or a routine, it speaks to the 
importance of having a clearly defined pre-trip safety routine and ensuring it is 
followed every time the vessel leaves the wharf. Incorporating Torner's method 
(1999) could help to create a climate in which safety practices are accepted as 
meaningful, valued aspects of a haNester's routine, rather than nuisances. 
Cultural and human capital factors play a role here in determining who is 
responsible for setting and maintaining safety practices in order to mitigate risk. 
A third example of cascading effects is the haNester who fell into the hold 
and injured himself, attributing it to "carelessness- the hold should have 
been closed. [There's a] person to do particular jobs on the boat, [but] we 
never had a hatch before. One's responsibility is checking oil, and so on. 
Nobody really geared in to [that] risky responsibility" (FH 44). This incident 
illustrates the interactivity of human capital factors (the haNester describes it as 
'careless,' as each person should know which tasks they are responsible for 
onboard), biophysical factors (a new physical feature on the vessel) , a social 
factor (changes in target species that lead to changes in vessel design) and the 
dynamism of working on a changing, moving platform. Binkley's work speaks to 
this kind of incident as well, in that safety assessments need to follow changes in 
technology or work practices (1995). The haNester in this example injured 
himself; to extrapolate from the incident, we can imagine that if he was fishing 
with a smaller crew than usual (due to a structural factor like financial constraints) 
and he was the only person onboard trained or experienced in navigation, the 
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incident could have escalated into emergency status quickly. This is why having 
redundant safety systems and a full complement of trained crew is important to 
fishing safely. Given the swiftness with which an accident can occur, and the 
exponential danger that can be created with multiple risk factors or problems 
occurring at once, it is vital to have several lines of defense in case of 
emergency. This illustrates the importance of having an integrated approach to 
safety, one which includes redundant safety systems and an awareness of how 
risk factors can combine. An integrated approach implies that the best way to 
promote safety is not by focusing on one specific aspect of risk at a time, but 
rather to attempt to create a safety framework with which harvesters can become 
comfortable. 
The fourth example is the quote that inspired the title of this thesis: "with 
sealing equipment, you're in God's pocket" (FH 17). Sealing is the single 
fishery that harvesters say is under-regulated, and they feel this lack of 
regulations makes them less safe while at sea. Being "in God's pocket" alludes 
to the trust one must have when dealing with risk. A harvester can take every 
possible step to ensure the safety of the ship and those onboard, but with no way 
to 100 percent guarantee a safe voyage, the harvester must trust or else 
abandon fishing as a livelihood. This relates to human capital factors like coping 
strategies: when faced with the pressures of making a living and doing 
dangerous work, there can be a tendency to ignore or downplay some of the 
risks in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance. This can be accomplished 
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through minimizing or trivializing the risks (Murray & Dolomount 1994), or 
"othering" risk (Joffe 1999). Power's (2005) work on coping strategies provides 
an interesting counterpoint to the psychological perspective which tends to see 
trivialization and fatalism as negative. Coping strategies like these might actually 
reduce the stress of worrying about what might go wrong, and being stressed out 
trying to determine how much of the power to control accidents is their own. 
Stress can lead to fatigue, which can lead someone to potentially make a 
mistake. Denial, fatalism, and trivialization can be considered ways of coping 
with the extreme individualizing discourse of government and regulatory 
agencies. It can be difficult to create a safe space to speak out against or resist 
dominant paradigms (Power 2005), and saying that one is "in God's pocket" 
might be one way to represent fatalism in a way that is not necessarily negative. 
The quotation also refers to being at the mercy of the elements, a 
biophysical risk factor which saw sealers stuck in the ice for almost a month in 
the spring of 2007 (Dyer 2007). Adding to the risks posed by weather and ice, 
harvesters also need to consider other sealers who are possibly untrained and 
inexperienced (greenhorns), and possibly shooting high-powered rifles in 
conditions with low visibility. Given the need to go out on the ice to retrieve the 
seal, this is one situation where cascading effects can clearly have tremendous 
consequences. 
The fifth quote, presented in the data chapter, offers a rich and complex 
perspective: 
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"We fished all our lives and enjoy fishing, invested everything we got our 
whole lives and could lose it all. There's fish - making us starve and let big 
boats go. They never hurts like we do. If fish are inshore why not let us 
fish it? I knows more about our job than those at a desk. We're getting 
same amount of fish in 6 nets or 12 nets as we used to with 110 nets (so 
there's lots of fish). Put nets down for 1 1/2 hours (12 nets) near Labrador 
and got over 30001bs - not that there's no fish - they just won't let us fish. 
Are they trying to get us out of Newfoundland? The big boats, factory 
freezer, their fish is leaving the country. The policy-makers thinks 
fishermen haven't got a clue. Big problem with safety- if you come to my 
boat you'll see equipment that I'm missing but I can only barely afford to 
get by. I'd like to have it but the bottom line is I can't have it" (FH 40). 
This harvester highlights the cultural differences in sets of knowledge, pointing 
out that his direct experiential knowledge conflicts with (and is undermined by) 
official discourse. The "policy makers" he speaks of are saying that there are no 
fish to fish, but his first-hand information leads him to believe otherwise. This 
may be due to certain fishing grounds renewing faster than others (a biophysical 
factor), or it could be that the science behind quota allocations is inaccurate (a 
structural factor) or could reflect differences in scientists' and harvesters' 
assessments of abundance and trends related to the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of their knowledge and the limited extent to which catch per unit of 
effort actually reflects abundance in many situations. Furthermore, with 'big 
boats' allowed to fish and smaller vessels not allowed, this situation could have 
evolved from corporate pressure to rationalize the fisheries, thereby reducing the 
number of vessels and harvesters. Such a process may be considered products 
of structural changes, influenced (culturally) by groups with greater sway than the 
fleet of small vessels. Finally, he says 'they' (DFO) are 'making us starve' and 
asks if 'they' are trying to get small-vessel operators to leave the fishery and 
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therefore the province. These statements demonstrate interactivity: the human 
capital factor of having to make personal decisions about livelihood and region of 
residence reflects the structural and cultural nature of thousands of people 
having to make similar decisions. This illustrates the need to consider risk 
factors in a holistic, integrated framework, rather than attempting to analyze them 
in isolation from each other. 
The sixth quote comes from a harvester who, when asked if there are 
certain injuries that are 'normal' or a common part of the job, replied: "cuts- you 
don't have to be careless for them" (FH 44). Harvesters are working on 
moving platforms (a biophysical factor), with varying levels of experience, 
training, and comfort with the activity (human capital factors). This harvester also 
identifies how cultural factors can interact with human capital factors. 
Individualizing theories of accidents (those which suggest workers who get cut 
are careless or accident prone) are perhaps rooted in land-based safety 
research, where work platforms are stable and the environment is comparatively 
constant. The harvester's comment suggests he thinks people often ascribe cuts 
to carelessness, and that he disagrees. While some cuts may be due to paying 
insufficient attention to the task at hand, it is not always the case. Fishing is an 
industry where one must work as fast as possible, as safe as possible, with 
safety sometimes being sacrificed for the sake of speed. 
Half of the harvesters we interviewed had experienced accidents, and 
most of them only had one or two in the last 10 years. Further research is 
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needed to determine whether the distribution of accidents among fish harvesters 
is more closely linked to the position on the ship, tasks being performed, or 
perhaps working in a marine environment. Falling overboard can be related to 
the position on the ship: the man who fell overboard 12 times is a gunner on a 
sealing boat, a physical location that is more exposed and precarious than that of 
the captain in the wheelhouse, for example. Similarly, cuts may not be due to 
certain 'careless' or 'clumsy' workers who keep having accidents; work in a 
marine environment is different from that on land. 
Because changes in technology can increase risk, it is important to 
supplement new technologies with traditional methods; the final quote is from a 
harvester who believes "a lot of young people can't determine the change of 
clouds. Traditional ways of telling the weather are always better, it seems" 
(FH 42). This may link to the decline in intergenerational, informal 
'apprenticeships'- typically, children (usually sons) were brought into the fishery 
and trained by their parents (usually their father). With increasing reliance on 
external technologies and institutions, people are being formally trained in 
specialized ways, where (particularly in a vessel with a small crew) jacks-of-all-
trades may be more helpful. This reliance is to some extent expected and 
necessary in an increasingly electronic and complex world as a characteristic of 
modernity; but traditional methods can supplement or provide backup in the case 
of technological failure. Changes in technology can be considered 'human 
capital' factors in the sense that people can individually take action to keep up 
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with new technology; but these changes are also structural as government and 
regulators bring in new technology that harvesters must keep up with. 
Summary 
Overall, what harvesters seem to agree on is that while some things have 
improved and others have stayed the same, there have been driving forces in the 
fishery since the early 1990's which were not present before and that have 
encouraged many of them to engage in risky behavior more often. This behavior 
may take the shape of going out when the weather was unsuitable, or going 
further out to sea in a small boat when a larger one would be more stable and 
safe. There are also economic pressures placed on harvesters; many of them 
forego survival suits, for example, simply because they do not know if the fishery 
will be viable for them next year. 
The following might work as a tentative understanding of the interactivity 
of risk factors, keeping in mind that this is not a simple, closed mathematical 
system and that there will be some factors that we are not even aware of (see 
Wynne 2002 on the notion of "unknown unknowns"), let alone able to quantify: 
(biophysical)+ (human capital)+ (structure)+ (culture)+ (dynamism) = RISK 
These factors are cumulative and interactive; this is not rational choice or 
game theory. All of the choices harvesters make, as well as the decisions made 
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by others such as regulators and other harvesters, impact the circumstances in 
which each next choice happens. That is, if a harvester had a particularly bad 
year in 2006 (had difficulty making loan payments and paying crew, for example) 
their choices in 2007 would bear the weight of 2006. They might lean towards 
taking greater chances for a bigger payoff: they might feel pressure to go in bad 
weather, to stay out during storms or gamble on whether or not a forecast for 
inclement weather will materialize. They also might try to make do with less 
safety and survival equipment, might try to fish with less crew so the crew's share 
does not take up so much of the profits, and/or might try to skirt some regulations 
by highgrading (discarding some catch at sea to secure better prices). 
Some types of risks are seen as being clearly within the individual 
harvester's control, and can therefore be addressed to some extent on an 
individual level. Overloading the boat and going out in extreme weather are two 
risks mentioned by harvesters that are sometimes ascribed to carelessness or 
ignorance on the part of the skipper. Harvesters tend to agree that such risk 
factors can be reduced by education. However, the choices and actions of 
harvesters, like any social actors, are shaped and constrained by the 
sociopolitical circumstances in which they are choosing and acting. To illustrate 
how this can lead to a harvester choosing to overload the boat: gear-setting rules 
only permit 24-48 hours to set gear, harvesters are not always in the size of 
vessel that they feel is safe for the fishery, so they go out in poor weather with 
more pots than they probably should carry at one time. Alternatively, the vessel 
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might be the right size for fishing but the wrong size for setting gear. There is 
certainly an element of personal responsibility that should be acknowledged; but 
many harvesters mentioned feeling as though they are in some ways forced to 
make the unsafe decisions that they have made. They know their actions may 
be considered careless or dangerous, but feel they have little choice. 
There are mitigating factors that affect the intended consequences of 
particular safety regulations. For example, the introduction of Individual Quotas 
for crab theoretically allows harvesters to choose when to fish throughout the 
season, but as the season goes on, the quality (and thus price) of the catch can 
decrease, or the season could be prematurely closed by DFO. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Newfoundland harvesters' observations on risk highlight the need for an 
integrated approach to understanding fishing safety, one which can handle 
biophysical, human capital , structural and cultural factors, as well as account for 
the way these factors interact in a context of industrial and policy change. 
Results from this set of semi-structured phone interviews with 46 Newfoundland 
fish harvesters highlight the complexity of fishing safety and of perceptions of 
risk. There are many ways to be safe (redundant safety, survival, and 
communication equipment, for example); but, simultaneously there are many 
things that can go wrong. Almost anything can happen to members of a fishing 
crew, from cutting a finger to breaking a leg, from getting bitten by a fish to 
drowning. There is no doubt that the generally remote locations associated with 
harvesting and the fact that Newfoundland and Labrador harvesting takes place 
in the context of cold and often hostile oceanographic contexts contribute to the 
risks associated with even relatively minor injuries. In a sense, this has been 
common knowledge among harvesters and their families for centuries. Individual 
risk to harvesters is considered 'part of the job' by most of those interviewed; 
however, what has not necessarily been obvious is that there are overarching 
patterns of risk, differentially influenced by various factors and having different 
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levels of effect on different fleets and groups of harvesters and that risk can 
change relatively rapidly over time as a consequence of environment, social and 
policy change. The notion of 'cascading effects' describes how these factors can 
combine and exponentially increase or reduce the degree of risk and likelihood of 
accident, injury or death. 
In this concluding chapter, I briefly summarize the major findings of this 
research. Next, I discuss the strengths and limitations of the study and explore 
implications and directions for future research. Finally, I identify the contributions 
of the research to the literature on fishing safety. 
Major Findings 
The research findings point to biophysical factors as a constant concern. 
Commercial fish harvesters have always faced risk from their physical 
environment; for instance, many harvesters said that severe weather plays an 
important role in fishing safety. In terms of risk being located in the physical 
body, harvesters note that fitness is important, particularly when faced with 
fishing alone. 
Characteristics of the individual, such as their experience or level of 
training, were also seen as having a significant impact on safety at sea. In terms 
of training, there are challenges to its effectiveness due to skepticism on the part 
of those harvesters who have not completed training. However, over half of the 
harvesters who had completed a safety training course felt that such training is 
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'extremely important' to fishing safety. Respondents also emphasized common 
sense and experience as important protective factors against accidents and 
injuries. 
Some of the harvesters I interviewed argued that safety promotion efforts 
are arbitrary and unfair, which could be considered a cultural aspect of fishing 
safety. There is controversy over which fleets are allotted quota in different 
fisheries, and subsequent controversy over the economic constraints created by 
'unfair' allocations. One of the most interesting aspects of this research, in my 
opinion, was hearing first-hand which risks are considered 'normal'; risks which, 
in almost any other profession, might be deemed unacceptable. 
Regulations were mentioned by many harvesters as the single biggest 
factor affecting the parameters of safety at sea. Rules such as those related to 
vessel replacement, tight deadlines for gear-setting and retrieval appeared to be 
the most significant from the harvesters' perspective. Financial constraints due 
to regulatory changes and the cost/price squeeze were also mentioned 
frequently by harvesters as having a significant impact on their ability to comply 
with safety regulations. These constraints sometimes prevent harvesters from 
being able to fish safely with a full complement of crew and safety equipment. 
Harvesters who have an expert knowledge of a particular fishery but move 
into a new area or vessel , or use new technologies, may find that their extensive 
experience is not appropriate for their new environment. The importance of 
remaining aware of potential hazards in a new environment is paramount, 
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whether it involves being extra careful around a new hatch, or taking time to 
become familiarized with charts and weather patterns for new fishing grounds. 
This demonstrates that the dynamism of the industry is an important variable in 
the study of risk. 
Another major finding of this research is that while each risk factor may 
present a serious danger in and of itself, when factors cascade (or problems 
happen simultaneously) the risk to vessel and crew grows exponentially. This 
demonstrates the need for multiple backup systems and vigilance while working 
at sea. 
Strengths and Limitations 
One of the strengths of this research is that it adds insights from active fish 
harvesters (the "view from the deck") to what is already known about risk at sea. 
Harvesters are situated at a pivotal point where they are able to see the 
simultaneous and interactive effects of biophysical, human capital, structural and 
cultural risk factors, as well as how the factors interact and change over time. 
This thesis contains valuable information which could be important to fish 
harvesters, regulatory agencies, and safety educators. The research makes a 
contribution to the academic pool of knowledge about risk in commercial fishing, 
and situates itself in an integrated framework. 
In terms of limitations of the research, our decision to conduct the 
interviews by telephone was partially an attempt to combat the effects of illiteracy 
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on responses. However, due to ethics requirements we had to send out an 
introductory package so that harvesters could give informed consent. This 
package contained letters from us, the researchers, as well as agencies 
supporting our work (the Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board, for 
example). Because of this, we likely received fewer responses from harvesters 
who experience difficulty reading and writing, and this may have affected our 
results. 
In their research on the New England fishery, Pollnac, Poggie and 
VanDusen (1995) interviewed harvesters to assess their level of knowledge of 
different risky situations. We thought the eight-item ranking of severity question 
was interesting and tried to replicate it in our interview schedule; however, it was 
difficult to do so over the telephone. Afterwards, I thought the question might be 
problematic because we were essentially saying "here is the actual statistical 
danger of particular incidents; let's see if the fish harvesters know which one is 
most dangerous." We were assuming that the level of risk is more or less static 
and objectively measurable; we were taking a question from one context and 
asking it about another set of fishing grounds; and we did not inquire deeply into 
contextual information, information we might have gotten from a question like "in 
which circumstances might swamping be more dangerous than a fire?" 
We learned that harvesters suffer from many health problems, but not how 
such problems are specifically linked to work in fishing. Two harvesters, who 
both identified themselves as having health problems likely related to their job, 
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mentioned that it is possible they would suffer from the same health problems 
while performing any manual labor as a career. Future research into fishing 
health problems should inquire more deeply into how these problems might differ 
from those in other labor-intensive, high-stress jobs. 
One final potential limitation lies in one of the findings. The results of this 
study supported previous research which suggested most accidents happen in 
clear weather (Jensen, Christensen, Larsen & Soerensen 1996); however, we 
only inquired about the past ten years, and no major accidents had happened in 
that timeframe to our sample of harvesters. What might be the case is that 
accidents with severe consequences for the vessel or crew (such as capsizing or 
drowning) tend to happen in bad weather, while minor accidents are just as likely, 
or even more likely, to happen in good weather. 
Implications 
This section addresses methodological and theoretical implications of this 
research for future studies in this area. One of the methodological implications of 
this research is that future researchers might want to ask different questions 
about safety training in order to obtain more specific and useful data. For 
example, the resentment that some older harvesters feel about training is an 
area that would benefit from further study. This study did not directly ask 
questions about this area, as the idea of resentment towards training was not 
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necessarily anticipated while designing the research, but it did emerge in the 
comments and tone of some harvesters when asked about the impact of training 
on safety. Further research in this area could help to identify ways of making the 
training more meaningful and accepted among older harvesters, and therefore 
potentially more effective in reducing accident rates. 
Methodologically, future research in fishing occupational health and safety 
would benefit from asking some different types of questions. For example, 
inquiring about the circumstances in which some risky events would be magnified 
or made even more dangerous. Similarly, it would be of great benefit to inquire 
whether the injuries considered a "normal" part of fishing would be common in 
other occupations as well. In terms of modifying the interview schedule, future 
researchers in this area may want to group list items differently to check for 
validity and reliability. 
When inquiring about level of job satisfaction, it would be useful to 
acknowledge the economic and occupational constraints of living and working in 
rural Newfoundland by asking questions such as: "is other work available to 
you?" This might provide some context for asking if the harvesters would go into 
fishing again; they may feel their options to be limited by their geographic region. 
The method of contact worked well for our purposes with this study; future 
researchers might enhance participation rates by doing presentations at local 
fishery meetings. The costs of recruitment would likely be higher, as would the 
response rate. Another important fact to keep in mind is the timing of research in 
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the fisheries, so that researchers are able to work around low return rates by 
considering political issues, fishing seasons, and other factors that might 
discourage participation. 
In terms of the theoretical implications of this work, it may be useful to 
investigate approaches to safety management that incorporate lessons learned 
from resource management. In particular, co-management regimes could bring 
resource users and dependent communities more directly into the management 
and science process (Neis et al. 1999). The benefits of this process include the 
sharing of power to make decisions, as well as accountability for consequences 
with a government agency. The most significant benefit of co-management 
noted is the heightened acceptance and compliance towards management rules. 
Future research in this area could investigate co-management regimes in 
different geographic areas to see what types elicit highest levels of satisfaction 
and cooperation. 
Given the extensive commentary on the lack of regulations and thus 
increased perceptions of danger in the seal hunt, future research is needed to 
explore the possible benefits and disadvantages of further regulation, and more 
specifically how risk can be reduced. Harvesters feel that increased regulation is 
needed to tighten restrictions on who can hunt seals, and in which type of vessel. 
Overall, theoretical implications for future research include the need to 
account for the dynamism of the industry; the need to consider the fishing vessel 
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as a workplace; causal multiplicity; and the importance of using a conceptual 
framework which is able to handle very different sorts of factors. 
Directions for Future Research 
I feel more research is needed on participatory processes that involve harvesters 
as primary stakeholders in fishing safety. To manage risks that are controllable 
at the individual, or crew, level, Torner's (1999) system of promoting safety 
intervention measures appears to work well. Having safety experts come 
onboard (at little or no cost to the harvesters; user-pay monitoring systems are 
another source of contention) to discuss putting rope in the right place, having a 
full complement of safety and survival equipment, and a trained crew, can permit 
safety experts and harvesters to collectively learn more about at what times and 
in which locations it might be possible to take action to prevent accidents. For 
those risks which are created or magnified by larger political forces, individual 
intervention may not be the most effective means to address such risk. I 
recommend adding a component to Torner's method which creates a space for 
harvesters to have input on external factors they feel affect fishing safety. 
Fishermen want more input on regulations, particularly those that will affect 
safety directly or indirectly. 
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Current approaches to fishing safety are typically driven by experts whose 
concerns are too often bounded by their disciplinary backgrounds and 
institutional interests. More interdisciplinary approaches to fishing safety and 
greater engagement of fish harvesters have the potential to substantially reduce 
risk at sea. As a social science researcher, I am neither a practitioner nor 
regulator. I understand that the knowledge I have sought to produce in this 
thesis is partial, like all other types of knowledge. However, careful attention to 
the voice of harvesters and systematic comparisons between that voice and the 
larger literature on risk has permitted me to contribute to the development of a 
third kind of knowledge with insights from both. Speaking with harvesters 
convinced me that their observations from the deck of the boat could reveal 
significant linkages and gaps between biophysical, human capital, structural and 
cultural risk factors and that these observations could help the fishing community 
move towards a comprehensive, integrated safety framework. By giving voice to 
harvesters who might otherwise go unheard, this thesis presents their views in a 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Information Sheet 
PERCEPTIONS OF RISK STUDY 
SafetyNet is a Community Research Alliance on Health and Safety in Marine and Coastal 
Work jointly funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, Memorial 
University, the Workplace Health Safety and Compensation Commission, and the New 
Initiatives Fund of Coast Guard, Transport Canada and DFO. The Perceptions of Risk 
study is one of six projects that make up Safety Net' s SafeCatch project on fishing safety. 
The aim of the Perceptions of Risk study is to explore fish harvesters' perceptions of the 
things that put them at risk in today's fishery. The Human Investigations Conunittee 
(HIC) of Memorial University's Faculty of Medicine and the Human Research Ethics 
Board at Dalhousie University have granted ethical approval for the study. The study is 
supported by Profe ional Fish Harvesters Certification Board (PFHCB). In fact, without 
their support, you would not be reading this letter. As you probably know, researchers do 
not have access to your personal information, in this case information about you held by 
the PFHCB. The PFHCB is contacting you on our behalf so that we can tell you about 
our study and see if you would be willing to participate. 
Should you decide to join the study, the information provided by yourself and many other 
fish harvesters will be used to produce research reports, including a report to Coa t 
Guard, Transport Canada, DFO and the PFHCB. It will also contribute to a graduate 
student's thesis and be used in some academic papers. However, your privacy will be 
maintained and your name will not be used in anything we write. 
We recognize that much research has been done on the fishery since the Northern Cod 
moratorium but we think ours is different and necessary. We are closely examining the 
existing statistics on fish harvesters' accidents, injuries and fatalities but these statistics 
can tell us only a mall part of the story about those things that put fish harvesters at risk 
and those that promote fishing safety. 
If you have any questions or would like more information before deciding to participate, 
feel free to contact us: 
Dr. Barbara Neis, 
Principal Investigator 
Telephone: 709-777-8249 






Appendix 8: Recruitment Letter 
Dear Fish Harvester: 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research project about fish harvesters ' 
perceptions of the things that affect fishing safety in Newfoundland and Labrador today. 
Participation in this project is voluntary. If you agree to participate, we will contact you 
by phone and carry out a phone interview. In that interview, we will a k you about: 
a) your fishing experience 
b) your thoughts on the things that affect risk and safety in today's fisheries 
c) your experience with risky situations, accidents and injuries 
d) quality of life 
e) things that might make fishing safer 
f) a few questions on your income and your general health. 
SafetyNet is a research group based at Memorial University. Our focus is health and 
safety in marine and coastal work. We partner with researchers at other universities and 
with community groups. 
The Professional Fish Harvesters ' Certification Board is partnering with SafetyNet in this 
study. They selected your name randomly from their list of professional fish harvesters 
and they have mailed this letter to you on our behalf. We do not know who has received 
our letters. 
If you agree to participate in this research an interviewer from Safety Net will telephone 
you. The phone interview we would like to do with you is simply a more detailed 
discussion of the issues listed above. It will take approximately 45 minutes, and the call 
will take place at a time that is convenient for you. Your identity will be kept confidential 
and your name will not be used in any reports resulting from this study. A final report 
containing no names will be available to participants and to interested agencies. 
Further details about the study are enclosed. If you would like to participate in the 
study, please complete the attached Contact Reply Form and return it to us in the 
stamped, self-addressed envelope provided as soon as possible. After receiving your 
reply we will arrange a time for the interview that is suitable for you. 
Thank you for considering this request. 
Barbara Neis (Ph.D.) 
Professor, Department of Sociology and 
Co-Director of Safety Net, 
Memorial University. 
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Marian Binkley (Ph.D.), 
Dean, Faculty of Arts and 
Social Sciences, Dalhousie 
Dalhou ie University. 
Appendix C: Phone Script and Oral Consent Form 
Phone Script and Oral Consent 
SafeCatch: Fish Harvesters' Perceptions of Risk 
Phase II: Phone Survey 
Confidential when Filled In 
Hello . My name is I am a 
researcher working with SafetyNet, a Research project based at Memorial University. 
With me on the phone is another researcher. 
You recently responded to our letter inviting you to participate in a research project on 
fishing safety. Thank you for getting back to us. As we explained in our letter, 
participation in this study is voluntary. If you agree to participate we will ask you 
questions about where you fish, your vessel, gear and the species you fished for in 2004. 
We will also ask you about accidents and injuries you have had, about things you think 
might affect fishing safety and a few questions about yourself including your income, 
quality of life and your health. There are no right or wrong answers. We want to know 
about your fishing experience, your experience with risk and with safety training and 
equipment. 
Should you agree to do this phone interview, you can refuse to answer any question put 
to you and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time. Your name will not be 
used in any reports or articles we produce from this study. Your interview will be 
assigned a number and the list of names will be stored separately from the interview and 
only research team members will have access to that information. The information you 
provide will be used only for this research project. 
Dr. Barbara Neis at Memorial University and Dr. Marian Binkley at Dalhousie University 
are leading this research. It is funded by a research grant from one of the national 
research councils, and by a grant from Coast Guard. This research has ethics approval 
from the Human Investigations Committee at Memorial University and from the Human 
Research Ethics Board at Dalhousie University. 
Are you willing to participate in this interview? Yes No 
If yes, is this a good time? Yes No 
If no, is there a more convenient time when I could reach you? 
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